Letter to Stansfield Turner and HPSCI Staff Report on Indications and Warning Intelligence

STAT Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 EOWARR P.BOLAND, MARDEYEVEL For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057 eee CLEMENT 6. ZABLOCRI, WI ¥ BILL D. BURLISON, MO. MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL. CHARLES ROSE. N.C. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES nm ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY. WYCHE Y. MINETA, NORMAN FOWLER, CALIF. JR., GA. PERMANENT ON SELECT COMMITTEE INTELLIGENCE BOB WILSON, CALIF. JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 ROBERT MCCLORY, ILL. J. KENNETH ROBINSON, VA. 4 AUG 1978 THOMAS K. LATIMER, STAFF DIRECTOR MICHAEL J, O'NEIL, CHIEF COUNSEL Honorable Stansfield Turner pe a x Director of Central Intelligence |oc #763 Washington, D. C. 20505 : Dear Admiral Turner: The Committee would like to bring to your attention the Subcommittee on Evaluation's staff report, Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability, three copies of which are enclosed. The Committee was instructed by the full House to conduct a study of the quality of analytical capabilities and the organization of intelligence activities. This report was prepared pursuant to that direction, and as part of the Subcommittee's ongoing consideration of warning intelligence. It is intended to serve two purposes: - to provide information and analysis necessary for future consideration of resources and evaluation of warning performance; - to call the attention of the intelligence com- munity to areas of relative neglect in indica- tions and warning and to the need for more fo- cused leadership. The Subcommittee has found that warning is a vitally important, yet vast and elusive, mission. Effective warning draws on the performance of almost the entire intelligence community. It also requires the understanding of intelli- gence users, since misperceptions about the warning process can contribute to "intelligence failures." For these rea- sons, warning is a particularly appropriate subject for sustained Congressional oversight. The Subcommittee on Evaluation plans to hold hearings on warning in the fall. it will Prior to these hearings, review your response to the Committee's request, made in the FY 1979 authorization bill report, for a report on actions taken to create a leadership focus for warning. Intelli- gence community views on that and other subjects considered in the staff report will be solicited at the time of the hearings. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 2004/05/21 ee M00980R003100010057-5 Should you wish to comment on the staff report prior to the hearings, the Subcommittee will consider your views with great interest. With every good wish, I am Enclosure Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  WE TAD aguetts,, ‘ary | aman’ ae “y OPN yee Approved For Release 2004 08/21 > 2 RDPe ModoedR003100010057-5 | }95th Congress } HOUSE OF ¢ a ALSENTAY lind 2d pention ee Lhe WARNIN 3 AN ASSESSMEN OF INTELLIGENCE CORI ANCE AND CAPAGILITY STAFF REPOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON EVALUATIO PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE +, August 1973 se 25X1 Approved For Ree : Serpe pee N3100010057-5 4 a ses 25X11 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  ae Up GOOLE UNCLASSIFIED oat i olenws , . Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : ClA-RDPS1MoosEoRCa}t04o-t4057/5) C1. “ m WARNING: AN ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITY Staff Report Subcommittee on Evaluation Intelligence La GET TSIM ACER ABSERICE AE: RSTRPIDS TE HEMEL NA Oo oa Ee Permanent Select Committee on g. U.S. House of Representatives August 1978 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 UNCLASSIFIED FE et SRR HEN gy Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 a UNCLASSIFIED PREFACE . : The" performance of the intelligence conmmnindty is rou- Sanely judged on the basis of accuracy and timeliness in warning. This mission -- termed also "indications: and warning" (I&W) -- consists of all the inbelligends activities that result in Sertene: pabional feaisicn makers to the need to consider taking some action. . his study examines the warning process and the organ- ization and evogedeos of the "warning community” -~- those iaveiiigance community elements that hold particular respon- sibility for warning. It makes clear that, although impor- tant parts of the IsW mission are neveornee uy the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ; the Services, and the Commands, warning is not strictly a military responsibility. It is a broad mission that requires the resources of the entire in- taiiadence community. The response of the "warning community's to lessons demonstrated by past warning and crisis management situations is evaluated. The dilemmas inherent in the organization and management of intelligence watch centers are discussed, and ins absence of a focal point for warning leadership is noted. | | The need for sustained oversight and policy guidance over a wide. range of warning-related issues is stressed, and forms the basis of the report's recommendations. Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Re ee er ee Zi Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 CONTENTS WARNING: Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability Wg? Preface ~. Summary of Findings F Il. Warning Intelligence. . A. Warning of What B. Warning Intelligence Cc. Warning: Terminology Ili. The “Warning Community" A. Collection and Processing B. Analysis Cc. .. Production — De Resource Management and Policy Control 1. Complexity of Management and Policy Process 2. The DoD Indications System , *¥ a. Office of the Secreta ry of Defense b. Defense Intelligence Agency 3. Leadership of the “Warning Community" a. Leadership in Production and Coordination of Warning Judgments b. Leadership in Warning Procedures c. Leadership in Resource Management 4. Summary IV. Response of "Warning Community" to Lessons of the Past 46 A. Changes in "Warning Community" Reflect a Learning 47 | Process 1. Pearl Harbor : 2. Cuban Missil e Crisis . 3. Czechoslovakia a “Al Vietnam, U.S.5. Pueblo, and Other Crises 5. October War 6. Recent Experience Five Lessons, Partly Learned 55 1. Improved Collection: 2. Better Information Management and Warning Procedures 3.. Better Analysis 4. Expectations of Unambiguous Warning 5. Users' Resistance to Warning Summary UNCLASSIFIED marcus For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  ‘ bee ae Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 v. Watch Centers: Evolution, Issues, Choices 78 A. Definition 80 B. Historical Development 81 Cc. Three Trade-offs «G5 1. Rapid Response or Strategic Warning Analysis 2. A Watch Office or a Current Intelligence «si ‘Production Element — 3. Coordination or Diversity in Intelligence Production ; — Peas 7 - 92 D. . Summary Assessment °: 95 vi. 96 A... Conclusions 1. Areas’’of Greater Sapeovement 2. Areas of Relative Neglect _ Bs. Recommendations 1.06 . 1. .Director of Central Intelligence . 2.- DoD Indications System APPENDICES Appendix A. Composition of "Warning Compunity" and A-1L ae e of DoD ITéw System Appendix B. NMIC Alert Center B-1 ‘Appendix C. CIA Operations Center . C-1 . Appendix.D.. INR Watch Center D-1 ‘Appendix E. National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC) E-1 Appendix F. White House Situation Room _ Pl ' Appendix G. Communications Systems Available to Isw Gal - Centers eae UNCLASSIFIED App rov ed For Rele ase re is e beni Hee ee ORO OO INOS iS: 25X11 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 |. Summary Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 2004) )SeT Pee RBRs1 M00980R003100010057-5 I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS This report evaluates present warning capability by asking: how well has the "warning community" responded to lessons of the past? ‘The Subcommittee finds that some lessons have been earned more readily than others. Emphasis on collection’ and on other problems that can be addressed primarily with technology has overshadowed attention to improving analysis vO and to minimizing uncertainty in the production process. five major Teesons are identified: Lesson 1: Improved Collection. Every crisis has stimulated collection efforts, advances in coverage, timeli- ness -- accuracy and frequency. Technical developments and a continual learning process have dramatically inoseeed col- LSeEion capabilities in most areas. Lesson 2: Better Information Management and Warning pedceduccy: Major changes in the organization of the "warning community," changes in communications and warning procedures, and widespread adoption of automated data processing have been spurred by past crises. Due to the absence of a focal poine for community-wide warning policy in recent years, efforts. to test the utility of new warning procedures, reporting formats, and crisis management procedures have been inconclusive. Lesson 3: Better Analysis. Analytical pitfalls have /” been recognized in post-mortems and other studies of past Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 UNCLASSIFIED  Approved For Release 2004/0324 254 RBBB 1 M00980R003100010057-5 warning situations, and limited organizational and training efforts have been undertaken in response. Existing mechanisms. do not ensure that analysts ask all pertinent questions or that they contront reasonable alternative hypotheses; the use of structured and analytical methodologies is still in its infancy, and improving analysis through better personnel Management receives little concentrated attention. awe Lesson 4: Expectations of Unambiguous Warning. Although history has demonstrated that warning is likely to be ambiguous, the expectation of collecting unambiguous in- dications continues to aetna. There has been little progress in developing warning products that reduce unneces- sary ambiguity by informing users of the probability of an event, and of the level of the analyet "a certainty in estimating it. Lesson 5: Users' Resistance to Warning. Past cases suggest that users' resistance to warning can contribute to “intelligence failure." Since decision makers' use of warning products lies outside of intelligence activities, the issue receives little attention from the intelligence community. . Because of relatively little attention to analysis and to minimizing unnecessary ambiguity, intelligence performance in future warning situations is likely to reveal familiar Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 UNCLASSIFIED  UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 3 weaknesses. Enough intelligence will have been collected, and, in general, processing and dissemination will be timely. While analysis may be good, key questions may not be ad- dressed. Differences among the views within. ene intelligence community may not be dsviert: and the warning products will not indicate changed in the estimated likelihood of an event. Asa pesule; the warning judgments received by decision makers will be less than clear and convincing. The report finds that the persistence of these weak- nesses is attributable to a lack of adequate leadership in the “warning community." The need for more focused leader- ship is evident, both at the community level and in the management of the DoD Indications System. - Therefore, it recommends: : ® That the Director of Central Intelligence provide a focus for warning leadership in the community, which may require appointment of a special assistant for warning; v e that the Secretary of Defense and the Services provide for the implementation of a comprehensive upgrade of che Drastianaesa World-Wide Indications and Warning System, iieluding clearer demarcation of authority and management responsibility among DIA, the Services and the Commands; and designation of a single point of accountability within DIA for DIA's management responsibilities for the System. These recommendations are further detailed in Section VI, "Assessment." Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 ll. Warning Intelligence Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-"RDP81M00980R003100010057-54 II. WARNING INTELLIGENCE A. Warning of What The purpose of warning depends on the interpretation of national intereuts held at any given time by national decision makers. It is the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, in a general sense, the broad spectrum of anewiedn policy shapers--who determine what events would so affect the national interest as to require special vigilance. The primary focus of U.S. warning activity has been the possibility of Soviet surprise nuclear attack. Concurrently, major attention has been directed against the possibility of Soviet conventional attackin Europe, with the prospect ofa rapid escalation to nuclear war. These have been the dominant national seenehey concerns in the period since the second world war, auetag-anich the field of intelligence known as Hi naieations and warning” has emerged. | It was in Europe that the United States first undertook the systematic monitoring of "indicators," or events that might predict attack. “Indications and warning" activity has since become worldwide, with certain technical improvements having occurred faster in okther theaters, but the problem of warning in Europe still being the central concern. Years of analysis, several Berlin crises, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 UNCLASSIFIED  Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 5 have resulted in refined lists of indicators, efforts to collect warning intelligence systematically, and a large corpus of estimative studies. It is well understood by the inven eaedes community that Soviet action of any sort threatening to Europe is of the Magness interest to U.S. decision makers. Similarly, the possibility of attack by the Peoples Republic of China against Nationalist China, or by a Soviet or Chinese- packed North Korea against South Korea, clearly receives warning attention. For aavclopasnte in the Middle East, Southern Africa, or other regions, warning requirements are relatively less clearly defined. The degree of vigilance depends on the ee of Soviet involvement and on the way that U.S.. leaders at the time define the national interest. | . Although warning of attack on the U.S. and. its allies quiets properly is the major focus of warning activity, "warning" as used in this study is not restricted to in- formation about attack, or even to information needed for a decision to commit U.S. military forces. For example, warning about the probable outcome of a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia may be needed to guide U-S. diplomatic actions. Even a situation of impending default by heavily debt-ridden countries may require warning, for the formu- lation of appropriate U.S. economic or diplomatic policies. Approved For Release SECRE ; CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 26s CHF :[cia-RDP81m00980R003100010057-5 Z Similarly, warning may not have to do with sudden, sur- prise events. It may require drawing the attention of busy decision makers to a situation about which they are already aware, but which, in the judgment of the intelligence com- munity, embodies Significant danger for the United States, and therefore warrants closer attention. Thus, the warning process consists of all the intelli- gence activitieso S ‘that result n in alertin aterting natio national decision nal decis ion makers: to the need to consider taking some action. Bs Warning Intelligence No absolute distinction can be drawn between warning intelligence and other functions of national intelligence, as all predictive intelligence has an-element of warning. Never- theless, warning intelligence can be described as those func- iene in which the Eo vowine four elements are present: 1) A warning judgment. That is, the intelligence community~-or some part thereof--considers a certain develop- ment or change significant enough to warrant special attention. The judgment might be that of a watch officer, who observes a number of unusual indicators of hostilities, and reports them at a high level of precedence. Or it might be that of an interagency working group which decides that changes in the situation it is monitoring warrant the President's atten- tion, and prepares a brief Intelligence Alert Memorandum to be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. ‘Approved For ReleaQiPpafep : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  SECRET Approved For Release 2004/05/21. : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 7 2) Unusual urgency and salience. Although every current intelligence product reflects the producer's judgment that the news is significant and deserves to be read, the purpose of warning intelligence is to enable appropriate pesdees to consider taking some action in anticipation of, or in response to, a predicted event or situation. There-- “Bake; warning intelligence is produced and transmitted as rapidly ert ee and is directed at higher level decision makenethan most current intelligence. 3) A finished product, actually received by decision makers. This might be a CRITIC message transmitted from the field to the President within ten minutes. It might be a briefing or a study based mostly on current intelligence, or an article dtawing attention to the significance of an emerging pattern of events. 4) Initiative largely by intelligence producers, rather than users. In warning, the intelligence community must assume the responsibility for deciding--sometimes under great pressure--what information matters, who must hear it, and how urgently. Thus, for example, a study specifically requested by decision makers would not normally be a gatnine Suteiiegends product. However, if the product contained an intelligence judgment that the situation is much more alarming than the decision makers realized, and therefore significantly sharpened the focus of their attention on it, it would be warning intelligence. Approved For Release “BER RE Tne M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 8 SECRET C. Warning Terminology | Considerable definitional confusion surrounds the sub- ject of warning. The following distinctions need to be made: 1) Tactical warning and strategic warning. The DoD Dictionary (JCS Pub 1) defines tactical warning as "a notification that the enemy has initiated hostilities." It defines wivatagié warning as "a notification that enemy initiated hostilities may be imminent." The distinction between tactical and strategic warning is one of time, with strategic warning occurring before the attack is iauneheds The actual amount of warning time provided by strategic warning may range ee minutes to weeks, and there is always an element of uncertainty in it. | / 2) Tactical warning and Poecas gence aetna: This - distinction underlines the fact that tactical warning re- quires little analytical interpretation. Once intelligence systems detect and identify he attacking forces, the role of the intelligence community is reduced considerably. 3) "Big W" and "small w.™ This distinction has to do with the degree of national interest associated with a particular warning problem. It was defined most recently in 1974 when the position of the Special Assistant for Strategic Warning was established. In that DCI directive "strategic warning," or "big W," is defined as "the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, People's Republic Approved For ReleasSbQRG2] : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 2004/05/21.: CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 9° SECRET | of China, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders or is employing its mili- tary capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the United States." "Small w" is . warning of eventsin regions other than those listed. 4) -Indications and warning, and current intelligence.- Indications, or warning intelligence, is usually performed by analysts who also produce current intelligence, and it always depends on the same information. (Problems associated with closely identifying warning with current intelligence are discussed in Section V.) The distinction is that "the warning analyst takes incoming scraps, matches them in his mind against an indicator list and frequently refers back to small nuggets that’ may have eng wince lost their current intelligence value. The warning analyst may find threat overtones in a pattern of events which otherwise, would be considered innocuous if viewed piecemeal."1 ‘This is not to eng that warning analysis should be performed only by those Beads Sposed to believe danger is imminent. Good warning analysis may sometimes require that the analyst conclude that _ events are actually not as ominous as they may first pupenes The essential ingredient in warning intelligence is a warning judgment on whether a situation represents a danger. 5X1 1) "A Watchman for All Seasons," Studiesin Intelligence, spring 1969. , nee Approved For Release SECRET Mo0980R0031 00010057-5  Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 SECRET 7 5) Warning and crisis management. The two activities are Pinaancutelis different. Whereas warning is a judgment be an assessment of probabilities, intelligence for crisis we management is simply current intelligence performed under pressure. In practice, situations that are being closely monitored for indications and warning can become crisis - management situations once the hostilities have begun. Conversely, warning judgments continue to be required for the duration of the crisis. The two functions are largely performed by watch centers throughout the intelligence community, which is another reason that they are sometimes considered synonymous. (The development of watch centers for indications and warning and crisis management is dis- cussed in Section V.) 6) daentine and prediction. Most warning cannot provide an accurate prediction of when, how, or even whether an | event will occur. In part, this is because of the cyclinal nature of the warning process. At a time when available evidence supports the issuance of warning, the prospective Opponent may still have several political and military options open. Even if he has decided to initiate an attack, his ultimate decision to execute it may be contingent on U.S. response. The principal value of the early warning judgment is to alert the President in time for him to take precautionary measures, to — to deter the adversary, or to foreclose particular options to him. Approved For Release “SECRET M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release sama bs 45 wa M00980R003100010057-5 Whereas an ‘accurate. prediction of the likelihood of hostile activity is the desired product of the warning process, available evidence sometimes supports only a more general notification of impending activities. Often warning does little more than signal a change. The inherent limitations of warning are reflected in the definition used in NIE ° 4-1-78 on warning in Europe: "an intelligence judgment clearly conveyed to national decision makers that the Warsaw Pact is taking steps to enable it to go to war in the near future and that the course of events has increased the likelihood of war in Europe." (Emphasis added) This general notification is the minimal product required of the intelligence community. In certain circumstances, more precise prediction is possible and should be provided. In either case, it is the responsibility of the intelligence Sonmink rks avoid unnecessary uncertainties in its warning judgments. Decision makers should not have to guess whether a given report oeveuenes a significant change in the intelligence community's judgment of the likelihood of an event. “Through well structured analysis and appropriate reporting formats, the "warning community" should inform. as explicitly as possible about perceived changes es the situation, and about the degree of certainty and of unanimity in its warning judgments. As the following sections of this study indicate, effective organization and leadership of the "warning community" are essential in meeting these requirements. Approved For Release Baa >) a alg Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 Hl. “Warning Community” Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 2004/05 FRADE S 1 moos80R003100010057-5 . III. THE "WARNING COMMUNITY" While most of the intelligence community participates to some degree in the warning process, it is possible to think of a smaller "warning community" composed of those elements that hold particular responsibility for this function. — It in-- cludes activities in each major segment of the intelligence seis -- aoliection processing, analysis, and production. This. section identifies the elements that make up the Sarnia community" and examines the relationships among them. A. Collection and Processing | Most collection resources produce some information relevant to indications and warning. With a few exceptions, warning intelligence does not requife special collection 25X1 systems. 25X1 Approved For Release SECRET CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 20g) Fia-RDPS 1 M00980R003100010057-5 25X11 As the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated in 1962, a picture, besides being informative, can be persuasive. Open source collection can also be important, both for ascertaining 25X1 facts and for evaluating intentions. Wire service reports, routinely scanned by intelligence analysts, sometimes provide the earliest news of a Situation of potential warning significance. Nevertheless, some collection systems are of particular relevance we indications and warning, either because of the 25X1 content of material they are designed to collect , the speed with which the information can be transformed into finished intelligence, or because of the system's flexibility to be retasked to collect intelli- 25X1 gence in a crisis. Approved For Release SECRE : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 25X11 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release 200 FRR EP RDPs1m00980R003100010057-5 - possible in each of the disciplines, intelligence on ememy intentions and changes in capability is collected and disseminated rapidly enough to provide early warning. The part of the iyosniiig comnunt ee involved with col- lection consists of analysts and managers who devcios the sets of collection targets for indications and warning, : who determine where there may be gaps in collection, and who undertake special studies and management efforts to improve collection for warning. 25X1 B. Analysis The Uwarnene community" is largely eanterea on the intelligence production organizations, since the analytioal process underlies the issuance of a warning judgment. Members include the analysts and managers of watch centers in each of the intelligence agencies and in Unified and Specified Commands around the world. In addition, current intelligence analysts who are not assigned to watch centers, and area or subject specialists throughout the intelligence Approved For Release seCRET M00980R003100010057-5  Approved For Release ee SEUREP™ M00980R003100010057-5 16