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Iran-ContraCIA1978-06-01letter

Letter to Edward P. Boland from Frank Carlucci on H.R. 12598 Title V Concerns

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Plain-English summary

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci writes to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Edward P. Boland detailing concerns regarding Title V of H.R. 12598. The letter states that undefined terms concerning science and technology could inadvertently apply to CIA intelligence activities and sensitive liaison relationships with foreign governments. Carlucci argues that intelligence activities should be specifically excluded from the bill to avoid overriding the Director's statutory authorities and altering congressional oversight channels.

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“We believe these science and technology provisions paint with too broad a brush, and that intelligence activities should be specifically excluded . from coverage”

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The Deputy Director x wl Central Intelligence Agency OLC 78-2002/C Approved For Release 2004/05/21 ; CIA-RDP81M00980R003100040082-4 oer Pasha eeeaen 20505 4.J ¢ / j June 1978 Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence . House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: We have been in contact with your Chief Counsel, Mr. Michal O'Neil, to discuss our concerns with certain provisions in H.R. 12598, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, " which has just been passed by the House. Mr. O'Neil has requested that we submit the Director's views formally to your Committee. Title V of H.R. 12598, entitled "Science, Technology and American Diplomacy," includes provisions apparently designed to consolidate policy control of international activities involving science and technology under the Secretary of State. Briefly, in our view, the provisions in Title V present problems because the underlying terminology--"science and technology’ activities, initiatives and agreement s not defined and, --is as a result, the provi- sions could be fairly construed as applying to activities involving intel- ligence activities conducted by the CIA concerning, for example, intel- ligence and internal security services of foreign governments insofar as such activities might involve "science or technology" matters. While we have no quarrel with the concept that national foreign intelligence activities should be fully consistent with foreign policy objectives, this legislation could be construed to require unnecessary proliferation of detailed information regarding intelligence relationships with foreign governments within the Executive Branch and the Congress. Intelligence relationships with foreign governments, including relationships involving highly sophisticated and technologically advanced collection systems, are among the most sensitive of intelligence sources and methods, and proliferation of information concerning those relationships could not only jeopardize cooperation with respect to particular activities, but also jeopardize cooperation in general, and valuable intelligence could be lost. Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100040082-4 ‘ Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100040082-4 ressional and Executive in discussions we have had with cong legislation, we have been informed Branch officers familiar with this nded to fall within the terms of that intelligence activities are not inte bill filed by the International Title V. Although the report on this in the analysis of subsection. Relations Committee contains language rt language fails to address 503(c) to this effect, we believe the repo title ig not clear. This lack fully our concerns that the scope of the elsewhere in the title, . of clarity, coupled with specific language 7 presents further problems; for example: Secretary of 1. Subsection 503(a) requires that the in consultation with State, on behalf of the President and 45 nce and Technology the Director of the Office of Scie fully informed and Policy, ensure that the Secretary is consulted before any agen undertakes any initiative respect to any ~ involving science an d can ology with r prov isio n. -. overnment “notwithstandin any othe . forei iths tand ing mpnasis aaded. @ phrase notw of law. -- n of law" coul d be inte rpretedas any other provisio ty to ate onsibili superseding the Director's statutory resp ized from. unauthor protect intelligence sources and methods of 1947, as amended, onal Secu rity Act disclosure under the Nati 7 ed section. as to obligations imposed by the propos of an annual n 9, «Subsection 503(b) requires submissio tion of existing inter- report to the Congress on the continua ements, including national programs, activities and agre foreign, policy implica- descriptions of them, an analysis of l benefits (and, according tions, the scientific and technologica of funding for and to the report, dangers), the adequacy and personnel require- administration of such activities, . Federal employeeswha ments and standards for training of n coul d be inte r- provisio participate in such activities. This ties for responsibili preted as reordering Executive Branch relationships with erni ng inte llig ence formulating policies conc involve science and tech- foreign governments insofar as they lligence relationships. — nology, and for coordinating such inte r 12036, such responsi- Under section 1-601 of Executive Orde with the Director of Central bility and authority currently resides a en Sint ae Intelligence. Approved For Release 2004/05/21 :CIA-RDP81 M00980R003100040082-4 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100040082-4 3. Subsection 504(a) establishes that the Secretary of State has primary responsibility for coordination and over- sight with respect to all international scientific and techno- logical activities of the U.S. Government, including, according to the report, "agency-to-agency agreements for cooperation in highly ... sensitive areas of science or technology."' This language could be viewed as shifting responsibilities to the Department of State and, in the Congress, to the Department's oversight committees. Insofar as intelligence matters could be construed to fall within the scope of Title V, absent clarification of its scope, we believe subsection 504(a) could alter what, in our view, is the appropriate oversight mechanism for intelligence matters--namely, the Intelligence Committees. Although subsection 503(c) incorporates language protecting against the public disclosure of intelligence information as a result of the provisions in that subsection, this language addresses only the issue of public disclosure and not the issues discussed above. We believe these science and technology provisions paint with too broad a brush, and that intelligence activities should be specifically excluded . from coverage. While the companion bill in the Senate, S. 3076, does not con- tain science and technology provisions similar to those in Title V of H.R. 12598, there are other provisions in the Senate bill which are of concern to us. These include provisions amending the so-called "Role of the Ambassador Legislation’ (22 U.S.C. §2680a) and the so- . called "Case/Zablocki Act" (1 U.S.C. §112b). We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with you in an effort to ensure that the Director's equities are not adversely affected by the legislation. Time has not permitted securing advice from the Office of Management and Budget as to the relationship of this report to the Administration's program, although we have sent a report to OMB and are discussing these matters with that Office. Sincerely, SIGNED Frank Carlucci Distribution: - Orig - Addressee - DCI - DDCI - ER 3 - DDS&T ‘ DDO/PCS - OCC ~ OLC Subejcet REY eee Pee- OLC Chrono OLC: RLApsmoved FrryReigase 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003100040082-4