Plain-English summaryDeputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci writes to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Edward P. Boland detailing concerns regarding Title V of H.R. 12598. The letter states that undefined terms concerning science and technology could inadvertently apply to CIA intelligence activities and sensitive liaison relationships with foreign governments. Carlucci argues that intelligence activities should be specifically excluded from the bill to avoid overriding the Director's statutory authorities and altering congressional oversight channels.
Key line (verbatim from the document)“We believe these science and technology provisions paint with too broad a brush, and that intelligence activities should be specifically excluded . from coverage”
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Full text (10,550 characters)
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Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We have been in contact with your Chief Counsel, Mr. Michal
O'Neil, to discuss our concerns with certain provisions in H.R. 12598,
the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, " which
has just been passed by the House. Mr. O'Neil has requested that we
submit the Director's views formally to your Committee.
Title V of H.R. 12598, entitled "Science, Technology and American
Diplomacy," includes provisions apparently designed to consolidate policy
control of international activities involving science and technology under
the Secretary of State.
Briefly, in our view, the provisions in Title V present problems
because the underlying terminology--"science and technology’ activities,
initiatives and agreement s not defined and,
--is as a result, the provi-
sions could be fairly construed as applying to activities involving intel-
ligence activities conducted by the CIA concerning, for example, intel-
ligence and internal security services of foreign governments insofar
as such activities might involve "science or technology" matters. While
we have no quarrel with the concept that national foreign intelligence
activities should be fully consistent with foreign policy objectives,
this legislation could be construed to require unnecessary proliferation
of detailed information regarding intelligence relationships with foreign
governments within the Executive Branch and the Congress. Intelligence
relationships with foreign governments, including relationships involving
highly sophisticated and technologically advanced collection systems,
are among the most sensitive of intelligence sources and methods, and
proliferation of information concerning those relationships could not only
jeopardize cooperation with respect to particular activities, but also
jeopardize cooperation in general, and valuable intelligence could be lost.
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ressional and Executive
in discussions we have had with cong
legislation, we have been informed
Branch officers familiar with this
nded to fall within the terms of
that intelligence activities are not inte
bill filed by the International
Title V. Although the report on this
in the analysis of subsection.
Relations Committee contains language
rt language fails to address
503(c) to this effect, we believe the repo
title ig not clear. This lack
fully our concerns that the scope of the
elsewhere in the title, .
of clarity, coupled with specific language 7
presents further problems; for example:
Secretary of
1. Subsection 503(a) requires that the
in consultation with
State, on behalf of the President and 45
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the Director of the Office of Scie
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report to the Congress on the continua ements, including
national programs, activities and agre
foreign, policy implica-
descriptions of them, an analysis of
l benefits (and, according
tions, the scientific and technologica
of funding for and
to the report, dangers), the adequacy
and personnel require-
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ments and standards for training of n coul d be inte r-
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participate in such activities. This ties for
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involve science and tech-
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Under section 1-601 of Executive Orde
with the Director of Central
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Intelligence.
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3. Subsection 504(a) establishes that the Secretary of
State has primary responsibility for coordination and over-
sight with respect to all international scientific and techno-
logical activities of the U.S. Government, including,
according to the report, "agency-to-agency agreements
for cooperation in highly ... sensitive areas of science or
technology."' This language could be viewed as shifting
responsibilities to the Department of State and, in the
Congress, to the Department's oversight committees.
Insofar as intelligence matters could be construed
to fall within the scope of Title V, absent clarification of
its scope, we believe subsection 504(a) could alter what,
in our view, is the appropriate oversight mechanism for
intelligence matters--namely, the Intelligence Committees.
Although subsection 503(c) incorporates language protecting
against the public disclosure of intelligence information as a result of
the provisions in that subsection, this language addresses only the
issue of public disclosure and not the issues discussed above. We
believe these science and technology provisions paint with too broad a
brush, and that intelligence activities should be specifically excluded .
from coverage.
While the companion bill in the Senate, S. 3076, does not con-
tain science and technology provisions similar to those in Title V of
H.R. 12598, there are other provisions in the Senate bill which are
of concern to us. These include provisions amending the so-called
"Role of the Ambassador Legislation’ (22 U.S.C. §2680a) and the so- .
called "Case/Zablocki Act" (1 U.S.C. §112b).
We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with
you in an effort to ensure that the Director's equities are not adversely
affected by the legislation. Time has not permitted securing advice from
the Office of Management and Budget as to the relationship of this
report to the Administration's program, although we have sent a report
to OMB and are discussing these matters with that Office.
Sincerely,
SIGNED
Frank Carlucci
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