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Walsh Iran / Contra Report - Chapter 16 Robert M. Gates
Chapter 16
Robert M. Gates
Robert M. Gates was the Central Intelligence Agency's deputy director for intelligence (DDI)
from 1982 to 1986. He was confirmed as the CIA's deputy director of central intelligence
(DDCI) in April of 1986 and became acting director of central intelligence in December of that
same year. Owing to his senior status in the CIA, Gates was close to many figures who played
significant roles in the Iran/contra affair and was in a position to have known of their activities.
The evidence developed by Independent Counsel did not warrant indictment of Gates for his
Iran/contra activities or his responses to official inquiries.
The Investigation
Gates was an early subject of Independent Counsel's investigation, but the investigation of
Gates intensified in the spring of 1991 as part of a larger inquiry into the Iran/contra activities of
CIA officials. This investigation received an additional impetus in May 1991, when President
Bush nominated Gates to be director of central intelligence (DCI). The chairman and vice
chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) requested in a letter to the
Independent Counsel on May 15, 1991, any information that would ``significantly bear on the
fitness'' of Gates for the CIA post.
Grand Jury secrecy rules hampered Independent Counsel's response. Nevertheless, in order to
answer questions about Gates' prior testimony, Independent Counsel accelerated his investigation
of Gates in the summer of 1991. This investigation was substantially completed by September 3,
1991, at which time Independent Counsel determined that Gates' Iran/contra activities and
testimony did not warrant prosecution.1
1 Independent Counsel made this decision subject to developments that could have warranted
reopening his inquiry, including testimony by Clair E. George, the CIA's former deputy director
for operations. At the time Independent Counsel reached this decision, the possibility remained
that George could have provided information warranting reconsideration of Gates's status in the
investigation. George refused to cooperate with Independent Counsel and was indicted on
September 19, 1991. George subpoenaed Gates to testify as a defense witness at George's first
trial in the summer of 1992, but Gates was never called.
Gates and the Diversion
Gates consistently testified that he first heard on October 1, 1986, from the national
intelligence officer who was closest to the Iran initiative, Charles E. Allen, that proceeds from
the Iran arms sales may have been diverted to support the contras.2 Other evidence proves,
however, that Gates received a report on the diversion during the summer of 1986 from DDI
Richard Kerr. The issue was whether Independent Counsel could prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Gates was deliberately not telling the truth when he later claimed not to have
remembered any reference to the diversion before meeting with Allen in October.
2 See, for example, Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, p. 135 (``Q. Do you recall that in this time
frame also you became initially -- well, let me not characterize it -- you became aware of what is
now referred to as the diversion.[sic] A. Yes. I had a meeting with the NIO, the national
intelligence officer, Charlie Allen, on the lst of October.''); Gates, SSCI Confirmation Hearing,
2/17-18/87, p. 13 (response to written interrogatory about his knowledge of the diversion).
Allen did not personally convey to Gates his concerns about the diversion until October 1,
1986.3 Allen testified, however, that he became worried during the summer of 1986 that the Iran
initiative would be derailed by a pricing impasse that developed after former National Security
Adviser Robert C. McFarlane failed in his attempt to secure release of the hostages during his
trip to Tehran in May 1986. Lt. Col. Oliver L. North of the NSC staff had inflated the price to
the Iranians for HAWK missile spare parts that were to be delivered at the Tehran meeting by a
multiple of 3.7. Manucher Ghorbanifar, who brokered the parts sale, added a 41% markup to
North's price of $15 million. With another increase added by Ghorbanifar during the Tehran
meeting, the Iranians were charged a total of $24.5 million for HAWK spare parts priced by the
Defense Department at $3.6 million.4
3 Allen believed, however, that he sent a memorandum to Gates discussing, among other
things, how much money North needed to pay Manucher Ghorbanifar from the Iran initiative.
(Memorandum from Allen to the DCI, Subject: American Hostages, 11/10/86, ER 19739; Allen,
Grand Jury, 1/4/88, pp. 19-21.) Independent Counsel was unable to corroborate Allen's
testimony.
4 Allen, Grand Jury, 8/9/91, pp. 100-02.
In late June 1986, Mohsen Kangarlu, Ghorbanifar's channel to the Iranian government,
informed the CIA through Agency annuitant George Cave that the Iranians had evidence that
they were being drastically overcharged for HAWK missile spare parts. Kangarlu asked the
Americans to lower the price. Led by North, the Americans first attempted to blame Ghorbanifar
for the overcharges. When blaming Ghorbanifar failed to break the impasse in U.S.-Iran talks,
North sought to convince the Iranians that the pricing was fair, and attempted to provide the
Iranians with falsified pricing documents.5
5 Cave, Grand Jury, 8/30/91, pp. 94-99; Allen, Select Committees Deposition, 6/29/87, pp.
534-40.
A frightened and angry Ghorbanifar finally called Allen in late August 1986 to complain that
the situation had become unbearable. He told Allen that he had borrowed $15 million to finance
the HAWK parts transactions, and that he was now being pursued by his creditors for repayment.
Ghorbanifar insisted that it was not his markup, but the U.S. Government's, that was responsible
for the pricing impasse. Ghorbanifar then pleaded with Allen to do something to resolve the
issue. Allen told Ghorbanifar that he would bring the matter to North's attention.6
6 Allen, Grand Jury, 8/9/91, pp. 110-13.
By this time, Allen had concluded that something was deeply wrong with the Iran initiative.7
Allen related his concerns to Cave, Duane R. Clarridge, a senior officer in the CIA's Directorate
of Operations, and North. North told Allen not to believe Ghorbanifar because he was a liar.
Instead, North insisted that Allen stick to the story that gathering the HAWK spares was
expensive and to not break ranks with other U.S. officials on the pricing cover story.8
7 Ibid., pp. 113-15:
I had begun to think along those lines, after the 15th of August 1986, when it was clear that
with White House support, Major General Secord and Mr. Hakim had established a new link or a
new channel into the government of Iran. It was clear that they were dealing with Hashem
Rafsanjani, Ali Hashem Rafsanjani, who was a nephew, I believe, of the current President
Rafsanjani.
It was clear to me that Mr. Hakim and Major General Secord were moving to take over the
control of the operation; that they were moving to exclude Mr. Ghorbanifar -- that was very clear.
I was very much aware that Mr. Hakim by that time and Mr. Secord were involved in other
matters, relating to the contras in Central America.
It appeared to me that Mr. Ghorbanifar's call was sort of the final indicator that something was
deeply awry -- that the problem was not Mr. Ghorbanifar; the problem was the operation being
directed by U.S. officials. And I then came to the analytic judgement -- based on all these
indications that money was being diverted from the profits from the sale of arms to Iran to the
contras in Central America.
I did not have hard proof of this. In fact, I had no direct evidence in writing from anyone. It
was simply aggregating a series of indicators into a conclusion. And at that point it was at that
time or shortly thereafter, I recall walking out from the building to my car late in the evening and
thinking very deeply about this -- thinking of the fact that two operations were probably being
combined -- that the lives of the hostages were being actually endangered by such a reckless
venture; [a]nd I raised the point with Mr. Cave at the office.
8 Ibid., p. 115.
Having received no satisfaction from North or Clarridge, Allen brought his concerns to
Richard Kerr, who was DDI and Allen's immediate superior. Kerr's deputy, John Helgerson,
joined their meeting. Allen testified:
I went through what was occurring. I brought Mr. Kerr up to date on the initiative. I met with
him occasionally to brief him orally on the White House effort and the Agency support. He had
asked to be kept informed when I had something useful to say, so I worked my way through the
current problem -- the fact that after the failure of the McFarlane trip to Tehran, there had been a
hiatus and efforts had been made to move this process along; but the Iranians had begun to
complain very strongly about the price being charged.
Then I went through the rationale of why I believed that the United States was charging
excessive costs to the Iranian government for the arms and that profits from the sale of the arms
were being diverted to Central America.
I made it clear I did not have direct evidence, but that when you put the indicators together, it
sounded as if two separate problems or projects were being mixed together. And I pointed out to
him that it made no sense to me and in fact could endanger the hostages in Lebanon.
Allen believed he also told Kerr and Helgerson that retired U.S. Air Force Major General
Richard V. Secord and Albert Hakim were involved in both the Iran arms sales and the NSC's
contra project. Allen related the markups alleged by Ghorbanifar, and described intelligence
reports that indicated that the Iranians were upset by the high prices.9
9 Ibid., pp. 117-18.
Allen testified that this information made Kerr visibly upset. Kerr told Allen to ``stay on top
of the issue'' and to ``keep him advised of any new developments.'' According to Allen, Kerr
pulled him aside later that same day and expressed ``deep concern.'' Kerr believed that if Allen's
story were true, the arms sales ultimately would be exposed.10
10 Ibid., pp. 118-19.
In various interviews, Kerr admitted Allen told him of his suspicions. Kerr also corroborated
Allen that Helgerson was present at the meeting. Kerr's account of his reaction to Allen's
information, however, differed from Allen's. Kerr said that, as a general matter, he did not find
Allen credible -- that Allen was ``a person who started and put out his own fires'' -- and therefore
he did not take his allegations as seriously as Allen said he did. Kerr had Helgerson there, he
stated, to calm Allen down.11
11 Kerr, FBI 302, 7/31/91, pp. 4-5; see also Helgerson, FBI 302, 9/5/91, pp. 4-5.
Still, Kerr admitted that he took Allen's concerns seriously enough to bring them to Gates,
who was Kerr's immediate superior. Kerr acknowledged this meeting in two interviews with the
CIA's inspector general, and in an interview with the Select Committees. Kerr stated that he did
not remember when this meeting took place, dating it some time between May and September
1986.12 In an interview with the inspector general on December 4, 1986, Kerr stated that
Gates's response was, ``God only knows what Ollie is up to.'' A memorandum for the record
written by a CIA attorney reporting Kerr's interview with the Select Committees recites that Kerr
testified that when he informed Gates of Allen's concerns, ``Gates responded that he was aware
that rumors were circulating that profits were being made on the sales of arms to Iran and that
money from the arms sales was being made available to the Contras.'' 13
12 Gates's calendar shows frequent meetings with Kerr in late August 1986, but this is
inconclusive evidence of when the meeting occurred. Dating the meeting is made even harder by
the close working and personal relationship between Kerr and Gates. According to Diane
Edwards, Gates's secretary, Kerr was in regular contact with Gates and was among a handful of
people who would see Gates without an appointment. (Edwards, FBI 302, 8/23/91, pp. 1-2.)
13 Working Notes, Kerr, CIA IG Interview, 12/4/86; Memorandum from Pearline to the
Record, Subject: Interview of Dick Kerr, 9/10/87, OCA 87-3899. Pearline stood by his notes of
Kerr's Select Committees' interview. (Pearline, FBI 302, 9/12/91, p. 5.) Helgerson told the OIC
that Kerr informed him shortly after speaking with Gates of their conversation. (Helgerson, FBI
302, 9/5/91, p. 5.)
Kerr told Independent Counsel that he did not recall Gates referring to other rumors of a
diversion at this meeting.14 The Select Committees' report of the interview did not contain the
statement that Gates was aware of ``rumors'' of a diversion, but it did state that Gates told Kerr to
``keep him informed.'' Accordingly, the evidence was clear that Gates's statements concerning
his initial awareness of the diversion were wrong: Kerr brought him the information from Allen
over a month earlier than Gates admitted. This would have been material because it suggested
that the CIA continued to support North's activities without informing North's superiors or
investigating. By October, when Gates claimed he first remembered hearing of the diversion,
Casey ordered an inquiry and later made a report to Poindexter; but, by then, the Hasenfus
aircraft had been shot down and Casey and Gates were beginning to cover.
14 Kerr, FBI 302, 7/31/91, p. 5. Kerr admitted that he and Gates had reviewed the incident
several times since. (Ibid.)
Gates's defense was that he did not recall the Kerr meeting.15 To say the least, this was
disquieting. He had been told by a very senior officer that two of President Reagan's personal
priorities were in danger -- not something an ambitious deputy director of central intelligence
would likely forget. Allen was acting as a whistle-blower in a difficult situation. His concern
was for the safety of the hostages and the success of the efforts of the President. His information
suggested serious malfeasance by Government officials involved in a clandestine and highly
sensitive operation. Even though Gates may have believed Allen to be excessively concerned,
could such an expression of concern be forgotten, particularly after it had been corroborated
within a few weeks? Logically, Gates could ignore or forget the Allen report only if he already
knew of the diversion and he knew that Casey and Poindexter knew of the diversion. Gates also
was on the distribution list for highly reliable intelligence that should have informed him of the
pricing dispute among Kangarlu, Ghorbanifar, and the U.S. Government, although it did not refer
specifically to any diversion of funds. Gates claimed that he rarely reviewed the intelligence.16
North testified that he did not discuss the diversion with Gates or in Gates's presence. Gates also
never met with Richard Secord, whom Gates was aware of only as a ``private benefactor'' (the
CIA's term for non-Government donors to the contras) by July 1986.17
15 In testimony he gave before the Select Committees' report was issued, Gates made no
reference to a meeting with Kerr. In two later Grand Jury appearances, however, Gates
acknowledged the conflict between his recollection of events and Kerr's, but he insisted that he
did not recall the meeting. (Gates, Grand Jury, 2/19/88, pp. 22-23; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, p.
140.)
16 Gates, Grand Jury, 2/19/88, pp. 13-14 (found intelligence ``confusing,'' so he stopped
reading it); Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, p. 138 (intelligence showed ``a couple of Iranian arms
dealers . . . lying to each other,'' so he stopped reading it).
17 North, North Trial Testimony, 4/12/89, pp. 7552-55; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 71-72,
87-88. Gates admitted that he and others were concerned about Secord's involvement in the Iran
initiative because of Secord's prior contacts with unsavory individuals, but he did not link these
concerns with the diversion. (Gates, SSCI Testimony, 12/4/86, pp. 80-85; Gates, Select
Committees Deposition, 7/31/87, p. 13.)
Notwithstanding Independent Counsel's disbelief of Gates, Independent Counsel was not
confident that Kerr's testimony, without the support of another witness to his conversation with
Gates, would be enough to charge Gates with perjury or false statements for his testimony
concerning the timing of his knowledge of the diversion.
Gates and North's Contra Activities
Gates maintained consistently that he was unaware that North had an operational role in
supporting the contras. He testified that he believed that North's activities were limited to putting
contra leaders in contact with wealthy American donors, and to giving the contras political
advice.18 While sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to question the accuracy of these
statements, it did not adequately establish that Gates knowingly was untruthful about his
knowledge of North's activities.
18 Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 59-60; Gates, Grand Jury, 2/10/88, pp. 74-75; Gates, Select
Committees Deposition, 7/31/87, p. 30; Gates, Grand Jury, 6/26/87, p. 36.
Gates first met North at meetings of the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) beginning in
1982, when Gates was deputy director of intelligence. Gates claimed that his contacts as DDI
with North were almost exclusively in the CPPG context, apart from meetings on intelligence
assignments. Other than these meetings, Gates said that he had little to do with North. He was
nonetheless aware of allegations that North was involved on some level with contra support.19
19 Gates, SSCI Testimony, 12/4/86, pp. 69-71; Gates, FBI 302, 5/15/87, p. 1. One disturbing
evolution in Gates's description of his knowledge is the degree to which he relied on McFarlane's
false assurances to Congress in 1985 that North was not involved in contra resupply. Before the
Select Committees, Gates claimed that the CIA, as a whole, was aware of McFarlane's
statements, and that the Agency relied on them:
I might add, you know, there's been a great deal of attention drawn to the letter that McFarlane
sent to Mr. Hamilton avowing that whatever North was doing was legal and proper. The House
Intelligence Committee were not the only ones who read that letter and were not the only ones
who believed it. So there was a predisposition that while we didn't know or certainly from my
standpoint, I think from the standpoint of others as well, that while we didn't know entirely what
North was up to, the presumption was that it was proper because of that letter.
But when the Select Committees asked if he specifically was aware of McFarlane's
representations at the time McFarlane made them, Gates was quick to deny that he was. (Gates,
Select Committees Deposition, 7/31/87, pp. 32-33.) In his 1991 Grand Jury testimony, Gates
reversed his position. (Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, p. 82.)
Notwithstanding his claims, Gates was aware of information that caused others to question the
legality of North's activities. The most obvious source of concern should have been Allen's
allegations, discussed above, about North's corruption of the Iran arms sales to support the
contras. But other evidence -- available before October 1, 1986 -- should have alerted Gates to
North's contra support role.
Gates became deputy director of central intelligence on April 18, 1986. As DDCI, Gates had
at least two sources of information about North's activities: CIA personnel -- particularly Alan
D. Fiers Jr. -- who had duties relating to Central America, and his regular contacts with National
Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and others at the NSC.
The Cannistraro Question
In the spring and summer of 1986, Gates became involved in a debate over what role Vincent
Cannistraro, a CIA officer detailed to the NSC, should play in the $100 million contra program
that was expected to take effect in October 1986. There was concern that if Cannistraro replaced
North, the CIA would be drawn into North's contra supply activities. Gates discussed
Cannistraro's assignment with a number of CIA and NSC personnel, including Fiers, Clair E.
George, and Poindexter. Gates met with Cannistraro himself in an attempt to resolve the
situation. OIC's inquiry focused on whether Gates, in the course of these discussions, learned
about North's role in contra operations.
By the time Gates became DDCI, Fiers was chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force
(CATF). Fiers ran the CIA's support for the Nicaraguan contras and planned for the day when
the CIA would again be allowed to provide lethal support to the insurgents. Fiers did not readily
share information about his unit's operations in Nicaragua. This had led to complaints with the
CIA's intelligence analysis directorate. 20
20 One of the protesters was Robert Vickers, the CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin
America from July 1984 to November 1987. Vickers told Gates that Fiers was not keeping him
informed about the contras. (Vickers, FBI 302, 4/28/87, p. 4; Kerr, FBI 302, 7/31/91, p. 6.)
Vickers did not remember this meeting with Gates in his most recent interview. (Vickers, FBI
302, 5/15/91, p. 5.) Vickers also complained to Cannistraro about being cut out of the new
interagency group on Nicaragua, and asked Cannistraro to assist him in getting into the group.
Cannistraro brought up Vickers's concern with Gates in a meeting at Gates's office. Cannistraro
told Gates that Vickers ``was very knowledgeable and was a real student of Central America,''
and he recommended that Vickers be included in meetings of the new interagency group.
(Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p. 9.) A PROFs note from Cannistraro to Rodney McDaniel,
Executive Secretary of the NSC, corroborates Cannistraro's efforts to get Vickers involved and
Cannistraro's meeting with Gates. (PROFs Note from Cannistraro to McDaniel, 7/21/86, AKW
022235.)
According to both Fiers and Gates, Gates's role in the contra program increased significantly
once he became DDCI. Fiers testified Gates became ``intricately involved'' in developing policy
and coordinating interagency work on the contras. Fiers dealt with Gates on requests from the
NSC and on structural discussions with other Executive Branch agencies about the contra
program. Fiers kept Gates informed ``generally, on our state of planning and the nature of our
operations.'' Fiers met with Gates regularly and weekly.21
21 Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 44-45; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 12-14.
Fiers testified that he did not lay out to Gates his extensive knowledge about North's
activities.22 From two events, however, Fiers concluded that Gates too was aware of North's
operational role with the contras. The first incident involved Cannistraro, who had been Fiers's
predecessor as chief of CATF.
22 Fiers's knowledge of North's contra-resupply activities is discussed more fully in the Fiers
chapter.
Cannistraro, then detailed to the NSC, was nominally in charge of monitoring all U.S.
covert-action programs. By June 1986, North's operational activities caused Cannistraro
concern.23 In mid-1986, media reports repeated earlier assertions that North was linked to
contra military aid. As an important House vote on renewed contra aid approached, on June 24,
1986, a resolution of inquiry was introduced in the House to inquire about North's activities. On
June 25, after the House approved a $100 million military and humanitarian aid package,
Representatives Lee Hamilton and Dante Fascell wrote the President for comment on the
resolution of inquiry; that night, CBS News ran a program that expressly linked North to the
private contra-aid network.
23 Cannistraro, FBI 302, 9/18/90, p. 2; Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p. 9.
On June 26, Cannistraro suggested in a computer note to Poindexter that the new contra-aid
program should be a ``regularized C[overt] A[ction] program which would normally fall under
my responsibility.'' Poindexter agreed in a computer note sent to NSC Executive Secretary
Rodney McDaniel that same day:
Yes, I would like to regularize it. The Vince-Ollie relationship would be the same as between
Vince and Howard [Teicher, another NSC staffer] on Afghanistan. Ollie will have mixed
reactions. He has wanted CIA to get back on the management of the problem and we need to
lower Ollie's visibility on the issue. Talk to him about it and I will follow up when I get back.24
24 Cannistraro, FBI 302, 9/18/90, p. 3; PROFs Note from Cannistraro to McDaniel, 6/26/86,
AKW 019032; PROFs Note from Poindexter to McDaniel, 6/26/86, AKW 021436.
Fiers recalled Cannistraro's move to take the contra program away from North, as well as
Poindexter's concerns about North's program. The question of who would run the anticipated
contra-aid program was important to Fiers and the CIA. Fiers had been planning the CIA's
program ``in earnest.'' According to Fiers, Gates was intimately involved in structuring the new
program, both within the CIA and the Executive Branch as a whole. Gates admitted he was
aware that Poindexter had been contemplating changes in who oversaw contra issues at the
NSC.25
25 Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 53-57; Gates, FBI 302, 5/15/87, pp. 4-5; Gates, Grand Jury,
5/1/91, pp. 103-04.
In the midst of the struggle over who would run the contra-aid program, Cannistraro visited
Gates at his office. Cannistraro told Independent Counsel that he came to express his desire to
return to the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO).26 Gates promised to urge the directorate to
take Cannistraro back. But soon Cannistraro's future became an item on the agenda for one of
Gates' weekly meetings with Poindexter. On July 10, 1986, Paul Kinsinger, an aide to Gates,
sent Gates a memorandum that stated:
26 Cannistraro claimed that he had long-standing differences with DO chief Clair George,
which is why Cannistraro went to Gates. (Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p. 6; see also Gates,
FBI 302, 5/15/87, p. 4; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 83-84.)
Vince Cannistraro called to say that Poindexter wanted to discuss how we are going to
coordinate the Nicaragua program. Attached is a short memo to you from the Director, you may
recall, that lays out the Director's views.
Vince also said that Poindexter would want to know whether Ollie North should be involved.
Peggy [Donnelly, a CIA officer assigned to the DCI-DDCI executive offices] checked with the
DO and they say yes.27
27 Note for ADCI, Subject: Late Item for Poindexter Meeting, 7/10/86, ER 27199-206.
The DO officer mentioned in Kinsinger's memo was Fiers. Fiers recalled that he specifically
talked about Cannistraro's duties with Gates. Fiers was concerned that having Cannistraro in the
management of the new program would bring a CIA officer ``into the proximity of operations
that I knew to go on, that were someplace we didn't want CIA officers to be.'' Fiers recalled
voicing this concern not only to Gates, but to George and Casey as well.28
28 Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 58-59.
Fiers made it clear in several meetings in Gates's office that he wanted North to stay involved
in contra aid -- and have Cannistraro kept out. Fiers recalled telling Gates:
I just think I said, if Vince were to take over the Central American account, he can't be doing
the same thing that Ollie is doing with the private sector people in lining up support for the
resistance. That crosses over the Boland Amendment, and it's just someplace that we don't want
to be. We've got to keep Vince away from that. And, I think those probably were my exact
words, or very similar to that.
Fiers testified that Gates ``understood me. We all understood that to be the case, and we were
going to have to keep Vince away from that.'' 29
29 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
On July 10, 1986, Gates raised the Cannistraro issue with Poindexter. Gates wrote after their
meeting:
I followed up on Vince Cannistraro's assignment. Poindexter clearly wants to keep Vince
indefinitely and while I told him that Clair did not have to have a final answer before the end of
August, his reaction strongly suggested to me that he will keep Vince there. I also repeated our
concern that should Vince take over the Central American account, that he should have nothing
to do as a CIA employee with the private sector people Ollie North had been dealing with in
support of the Contras.
Cannistraro remained at the NSC,30 and was not transferred.
30 Memorandum from Gates to the Record, Subject: Meeting with Adm. Poindexter,
7/11/86, ER 27195-97 (emphasis added); Gates, FBI 302, 5/15/87, pp. 4-5. See also Poindexter,
Select Committees Deposition, 5/2/87, pp. 200-02 (giving his reasons for easing North out of the
contra effort, and North's reluctance to leave).
Gates's explanation of these events was that he wanted to keep Cannistraro from becoming
entangled with the contras for political reasons -- and not because he was concerned about North.
Gates was concerned, he said, about Congress finding a CIA employee anywhere close to the
situation. Gates claimed he had not considered the legality or nature of what North was doing on
behalf of the contras: ``I had no concerns -- I had no reason to have concerns based on what was
available to me about North's contacts with the private sector people, but I didn't think a CIA
person should do it.'' 31
31 Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 79-83, 85. The information that Gates claimed to have
about North consisted of ``rumors'' from various Government officials that North had put contra
leaders in touch with Secord and retired U.S. Army Major General John K. Singlaub. Gates
testified that at the time he did not know that North had ``hands-on'' involvement with contra
resupply. (Ibid., pp. 86-89.)
Gates acknowledged that he might have raised the Cannistraro issue with Fiers, but he did not
recall it. He did not recall any conversations with Fiers and he claimed not to recall any
recommendation from Fiers one way or the other.32
32 Ibid., pp. 110-11. Fiers said that a ``note-taker'' usually attended his meetings with Gates.
This note-taker was Kinsinger. Fiers remembers telling Kinsinger -- whom Fiers did not
remember by name -- occasionally not to write down things such as disparaging comments or
other matters because of their sensitivity. Fiers also would ask Kinsinger to leave the room for
matters that he wanted to discuss privately with Gates. (Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 45-46.)
Kinsinger kept none of his notes for the period that he served as Gates's aide. (Kinsinger, FBI
302, 7/25/91, p. 8.)
Given the accusations swirling about North's support of the contra rebels, and the prospect of
a formal Congressional inquiry into North's actions, Gates must have been concerned about the
nature of his activities as a threat to the planned resumption of support to the CIA. It was,
however, also politically wise to keep Cannistraro away from any activities that resembled
North's. Independent Counsel did not believe that provable evidence of Gates's awareness of
North's operational activities would sustain a prosecution for his denials to the Select
Committees or to OIC.
Sale of Enterprise Assets
North attempted to sell aircraft and a vessel, the Erria, that were owned by the Enterprise to
the CIA. The proposed sales were discussed in Gates's presence at meetings with Poindexter.
Gates also spoke about the aircraft with Fiers, who discouraged their purchase. These
discussions must have provided some additional knowledge about North's role in contra
resupply.
The Erria had carried munitions to Central America for the contras.33 Poindexter, Gates and
Casey discussed the Erria at one of their weekly meetings in May 1986. Memoranda prepared
for that meeting associated North with the Erria. Cannistraro recalled that discussion of the ship
at a Poindexter-Gates meeting suggested Gates knew the Erria was used in support of North's
contra operation.34
33 North, North Trial Testimony, 4/7/89, pp. 6883-84. North approached several CIA officers
with his proposal. North asked Cannistraro to convince the CIA to purchase the ship as a
floating broadcast platform. Cannistraro found out that CIA officers had considered the matter
and had declined North's offer because of the ship's association with Thomas Clines.
(Cannistraro, Grand Jury, 6/15/87, pp. 53-65; see also Twetten, Select Committees Deposition,
4/22/87, pp. 181-82; Haskell, FBI 302, 7/6-7/7/87, p. 10.)
34 Memorandum from Cannistraro to Poindexter, Subject: Agenda for Your Weekly Meeting
. . . , 5/14/86, AKW 045227-28; Memorandum, Item . . . Poindexter May Raise With The DCI at
their 8 May Meeting, 5/8/86, ER 143-5 91-0041; Gates 1986 Appointment Book, 5/15/86; DCI
Schedule, 5/15/86, ER 598; Kinsinger, FBI 302, 7/25/91, p. 9; Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p.
10. See also Poindexter, Select Committees Deposition, 5/2/87, pp. 221-22 (recounting
discussions with the CIA about its purchasing the Erria).
At a later meeting, Gates and Poindexter discussed North's proposal that the CIA buy the
Enterprise's aircraft. In a computer note to Poindexter dated July 24, 1986, North complained
that the CIA was unwilling to purchase the Enterprise assets and urged Poindexter to ask Casey
to reconsider. Poindexter responded that he did ``tell Gates that the private effort should be
phased out. Please tell Casey about this. I agree with you.'' Poindexter later elaborated that he
had told Gates that the Enterprise's assets were available for purchase, and that Gates said he
would check on the matter.35
35 See PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 7/24/86, AKW 021735; PROFs Note from
Poindexter to North, 7/26/86, AKW 021732; Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 5/2/87,
pp. 187-88, 228.
North's calendar and pocket cards show that North scheduled a meeting with Gates for July
29, 1986, three days later. Gates's calendar also shows a meeting with North on July 29.36
About this time, Gates approached Fiers and asked why the Central American Task Force would
not purchase North's, or ``the private benefactor's,'' aircraft. According to Fiers, Gates accepted
Fiers' explanation that the aircraft were in poor condition and unduly risky for the CIA. Fiers
also ``vaguely'' recalled discussing ``phasing out the private Contra aid effort'' with Gates in July
1986. Both men agreed that the private effort was a political liability for the Agency. From
their discussions, Fiers -- like Cannistraro -- concluded that Gates was aware that ``North was
running a private supply operation.'' 37
36 North Schedule Card, 7/29/86, AKW 002640; Gates 1986 Appointment Book (Doc. No.
258). When asked about this meeting by SSCI in his second confirmation hearings. Gates could
not recall the meeting. (SSCI Confirmation Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of
Central Intelligence, Sen. Exec. Rpt. No. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 80 (Oct. 24, 1991).
10/19/91, p. 85.)
37 Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 68-69; Fiers, FBI 302, 8/1/91, pp. 14, 16. See also Sen.
Exec. Rpt. No. 102-19, p. 80.
Gates denied discussing phasing out the private resupply effort with Poindexter. Asked about
Poindexter's message to North, Gates testified that he examined his records upon reading the
message and could find no evidence that such a meeting with Poindexter occurred. Gates
claimed, ``If Poindexter made a comment to me like that, it would have been in the context of
once the authorized program is approved there would be no point in having any of these private
benefactors any longer.'' Neither did Gates recall meeting with North about the Erria during this
time.38
38 Gates, Grand Jury, 2/10/88, pp. 76-77.
The evidence established that Gates was exposed to information about North's connections to
the private resupply operation that would have raised concern in the minds of most reasonable
persons about the propriety of a Government officer having such an operational role. Fiers and
Cannistraro believed that Gates was aware of North's operational role. The question was whether
there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates deliberately lied in denying knowledge of
North's operational activities. A case would have depended on the testimony of Poindexter.
Fiers would not testify that he supplied Gates with the details of North's activities. In the end,
Independent Counsel concluded that the question was too close to justify the commitment of
resources. There were stronger, equally important cases to be tried.
Obstruction of the Hasenfus Inquiries
There was conclusive evidence that in October 1986, following the Hasenfus shootdown,
Clair George and Alan Fiers obstructed two congressional inquiries.39 Gates attended meetings
where the CIA's response to these inquiries was discussed. None of the evidence, however, links
Gates to any specific act of obstruction.
39 See George and Fiers chapters.
The background for Congress's inquiries into the Hasenfus shootdown is discussed in the
Fiers and George chapters. By October 9, 1986, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
(SCFR) had set a hearing on the shootdown for October 10, 1986, and the House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) had set a hearing for
October 14, 1986. Gates's main concern during this period was convincing Congress that the
CIA had sponsored no resupply flights. He appeared before SSCI on October 8, 1986, and gave
the committee brief biographies of the pilots on the downed plane. He responded to Senator
Cohen when asked whether the plane was owned by a CIA proprietary:
No, sir. We didn't have anything to do with that. And while we know what is going in --
going on with the Contras, obviously as you indicate, by virtue of what we come up here and
brief, I will tell you that I know from personal experience we have, I think, conscientiously tried
to avoid knowing what is going on in terms of any of this private funding, and tried to stay away
from it. Somebody will say something about Singlaub or something like, we will say I don't want
to hear anything about it.40
40 Gates, SSCI Testimony, 10/8/86, p. 9.
To the extent that Gates spoke for others in the CIA, this was wrong. It was true that the
Hasenfus plane was not owned by a CIA proprietary. But as set forth in the Fiers, George, and
Fernandez chapters, several individual CIA officers had not stayed away from
``private-benefactor'' activities. There was no evidence, however, that Gates knew this as early as
October 8, 1986, although he did know by then of the concern that North and Secord were
diverting funds from the Iran arms sales to the contras.41
41 Gates was informed by Allen about the diversion, North, and Secord on October 1, 1986,
and met with Allen and Casey about them on October 7.
The day after his SSCI testimony Gates double-checked his statements with a number of
people. He met with Fiers and George at 10:10 a.m. on October 9 and was told ``that there had
been no contact between -- that the Agency wasn't involved in the Hasenfus matter at all.'' Gates
then had lunch with Casey and North. North had just returned from negotiations in Frankfurt
with the ``Second Channel'' to the Iranian government. North briefed Gates and Casey on the
progress of the negotiations. The discussion then turned to the contras. North testified at trial
and before the Grand Jury that during this luncheon, Casey told him that North's Iran and contra
operations were unraveling, and that he should begin to clean up both of them. North specifically
recalled being told by Casey about allegations by Roy Furmark of a diversion; he did not recall
telling Gates about the diversion or going into detail about the nature of his operations. North
also did not recall whether Gates was there when Casey told North to clean up his operation.42
42 DDCI Appointments -- Thursday, 10/9/86, AKY 006296; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp.
176-77; Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/16/91, pp. 6-7; North, North Trial Testimony, 4/12/89, pp. 7552-57;
North, Grand Jury, 3/8/91, pp. 30-32. Casey testified in December 1986 that the October 1986
luncheon included questions concerning a possible diversion. (Casey, HPSCI Testimony,
12/11/86, pp. 120-21; Casey, House Appropriations Subcommittee Testimony, 12/8/86, p. 102.)
In his testimony about the lunch, Gates stressed his attempt to get North to confirm that the
CIA was not involved with the Hasenfus crash. Gates claimed that he was not invited to the
lunch, and that he ``crashed the lunch'' because he wanted to speak with North. Gates said that
Casey discussed the Furmark allegations with North and told him that the situation had to be
straightened out. Gates remembered no instruction from Casey to North to start cleaning up
operations, but did recall asking North directly whether any CIA personnel had been involved in
the resupply network. Gates said that North told him that the CIA was ``absolutely clean.'' North
made a ``cryptic comment'' about Swiss bank accounts, which Gates claimed not to have
understood. Gates stated that he then left Casey's office for ten minutes, and returned to ask
Casey alone about North's comment about Swiss accounts. Casey seemed not to have picked up
on the comment, and Gates dropped it.43
43 Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 177-79; Gates, Grand Jury, 6/26/87, pp. 8-11; Gates, Select
Committees Deposition, 7/31/87, pp. 23-29, 33-35; Gates, Grand Jury, 2/19/88, pp. 46-47; Gates,
FBI 302, 5/15/87, p. 5. When confronted with Gates's account of the meeting, Casey did not
dispute it. (Casey, HPSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, pp. 180-81.)
Gates changed his story in only one significant way between his early testimony and his final
Grand Jury appearance: He expressly added that he left Casey and North alone together during
lunch.
Gates wrote an exculpatory memo the next day. Gates wrote:
North confirmed to the DCI and to me that, based on his knowledge of the private funding
efforts for the Contras, CIA is completely clean on the question of any contacts with those
organizing the funding and the operations. He affirmed that a clear separation had been
maintained between the private efforts and CIA assets and individuals, including proprietaries.
Gates recorded North's purportedly exculpatory statement uncritically, even though he was by
then clearly aware of the possible diversion of U.S. funds through the ``private benefactors.''
Although, in testimony before SSCI, Gates admitted that his concerns about Allen's allegations
were behind the questioning of North, he did not ask North whether a diversion had occurred.
He was interested only in eliciting statements protective of his Agency.44
44 Memorandum from Gates to the Record, Subject: Lunch with Ollie North, 10/10/86, ER
24605; Gates, SSCI Testimony, 12/4/86, p. 20.
After his lunch with North and his post-lunch discussion with Casey, Gates met again with
Casey and George at 1:45 p.m. on ``Directorate Reporting.'' Casey then briefed congressional
leaders about the downed aircraft. Casey and Gates then met with George, Fiers and the CIA's
congressional affairs chief, David Gries. Gates, George and Gries stated that they did not recall
what occurred at this meeting. Fiers recalled that the meeting concerned whether it would be
Gates or George who testified on October 10 before SCFR. Fiers testified that he, Casey and
George had decided earlier on October 9 that George was to testify. As Fiers recalled it, the later
meeting was to give Gries the opportunity to argue in favor of Gates testifying. The content of
the next day's briefing, except for the categorical denial made in the CIA's opening statement,
was not discussed.45
45 George, Grand Jury, 4/5/91, pp. 72-73; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 197-98; Gries, FBI
302, 4/9/91, pp. 4-5; Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/16/91, pp. 19-20.
The early evening meeting of Casey, Gates, George, Fiers, and Gries ended Gates's
involvement with the preparation of the CIA's testimony concerning the Hasenfus crash. The
only other evidence relating to Gates during this period was a meeting that took place in Casey's
office around the time of George and Fiers's briefing of HPSCI on October 14, 1986. During this
meeting, Fiers told George and Casey that the Hasenfus inquiries would not end until someone
took responsibility for the private resupply flights. Fiers recommended that Secord take
responsibility. George turned to Casey and said, ``Bill, you know Secord has other problems,''
and the conversation ended soon after. Fiers had a vague recollection of Gates being present for
part of the conversation, and then leaving the room. Fiers was uncertain if Gates heard his
remarks about Secord.46
46 Ibid., pp. 40-43.
At most, the evidence showed that Gates was in and around meetings where the content of
George and Fiers's testimony was discussed, and that he participated in two briefings that helped
lull congressional investigators into believing that the CIA was not involved in facilitating
private resupply flights. The evidence shows further that Gates was aware of at least general
information suggesting involvement by North and Secord with the contras, and that Gates did not
disclose this information -- or argue that it should be disclosed. For Gates, the CIA's task in
October 1986 was to distance the CIA from the private operation, in part by locking North into
statements that cleared the CIA of wrongdoing.47
47 Indeed, according to Allen, when Allen first discussed rumors of a diversion with Gates on
October 1, 1986, Gates told Allen he ``didn't want to hear about Central America'' and ``I've
supported Ollie in other activities . . . but he's gone too far.'' (Allen, Grand Jury, 1/4/88, pp.
31-33.) See also Gates, SSCI Testimony, 12/4/86, pp. 18-19 (confirming that he told Allen that
he ``didn't want to hear anything about funding for the Contras'').
In the end, although Gates's actions suggested an officer who was more interested in shielding
his institution from criticism and in shifting the blame to the NSC than in finding out the truth,
there was insufficient evidence to charge Gates with a criminal endeavor to obstruct
congressional investigations into the Hasenfus shootdown.
Gates and Casey's November 1986 Testimony
The events leading up to the preparation of false testimony by Director Casey in November
1986 -- preparations that Gates nominally oversaw -- are set forth in a separate chapter of this
Report. There was insufficient evidence that Gates committed a crime as he participated in the
preparation of Casey's testimony, or that he was aware of critical facts indicating that some of the
statements by Casey and others were false.
Conclusion
Independent Counsel found insufficient evidence to warrant charging Robert Gates with a
crime for his role in the Iran/contra affair. Like those of many other Iran/contra figures, the
statements of Gates often seemed scripted and less than candid. Nevertheless, given the complex
nature of the activities and Gates's apparent lack of direct participation, a jury could find the
evidence left a reasonable doubt that Gates either obstructed official inquiries or that his two
demonstrably incorrect statements were deliberate lies.