Walsh Final Report: Chapter 24, George P. Shultz, M. Charles Hill and Nicholas Platt

Walsh Iran / Contra Report - Chapter 24 The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt Chapter 24 The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt From the Reagan Administration's first suggestion in June 1985 that the United States should transfer arms to Iran through the final decision in December 1986 that arms shipments would cease, Department of State officials opposed these dealings for reasons of policy and status. Department officials argued that trading arms for hostages would only increase the value and therefore the number of hostages. They also believed that the Department, not the National Security Council staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, should establish counterterrorism policy, including dealings with Iran and efforts to free hostages in Lebanon. During 1985 and 1986, senior State Department officials monitored the U.S. contacts with Iranians quite closely, with increasing consternation. At several points, department officials attempted to stop the arms-for-hostages initiative. At least twice, they attempted to circumvent it by opening other channels to Iran. After the arms-for-hostages story broke in November 1986, the department and Secretary of State George P. Shultz eventually used the revelations to regain control over counterterrorism policy. Following a strenuous bureaucratic struggle, Shultz persuaded President Reagan to prohibit further arms transfers to Iran and to announce that the Department of State would take the lead on such counterterrorism and diplomatic matters in the future. During the congressional investigations in December 1986 and throughout 1987, Shultz testified -- to great effect -- about State Department efforts to oppose arms shipments to Iran and State's limited contemporaneous knowledge of the activities in this regard of the NSC staff. In contrast to other agencies, State Department officials appeared open and cooperative; they were the emerging heroes of the Iran/contra story and seemed to have nothing to hide. In 1990 and 1991, however, Independent Counsel received new evidence, in the form of handwritten notes that had not been provided in response to previous document requests, suggesting for the first time that central aspects of Shultz's testimony were incorrect. Based on the notes, it appeared that Shultz and other senior Department of State officials had known significantly more about arms shipments to Iran than Shultz's testimony reflected. As a result of this new evidence, Independent Counsel conducted an investigation into whether Shultz or other department officials deliberately misled or withheld information from Iran/contra investigators. Independent Counsel concluded that Shultz's testimony was incorrect, if not false, in significant respects and misleading, if literally true, in others, and that information had been withheld from investigators by Shultz's executive assistant, M. Charles Hill. Nevertheless, for reasons explained in this chapter, the investigation did not result in criminal charges. Department of State Organization and Arms Shipments to Iran During 1985 and 1986, Shultz was the secretary of state, John C. Whitehead was deputy secretary of state and Michael H. Armacost was under secretary of state for political affairs. These senior ranking officials met daily to keep each other informed of the department's activities and relevant domestic and international events.1 1 Armacost, Grand Jury, 3/13/92, p. 6. Shultz and Whitehead were political appointees. Armacost was a career foreign service officer. During 1985 and 1986, two other senior foreign service officers occupied posts of importance in the department: Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, and Shultz's executive assistant, M. Charles Hill. Formally, the executive secretary was responsible for making sure that the secretary of state was adequately supported by the department bureaucracy: that matters were appropriately staffed, that deadlines were met and that appropriate guidance was given up and down the bureaucratic chain of command.2 To fulfill that role, Platt attended and made a detailed handwritten record during most of Shultz's meetings within the department.3 One of Platt's two deputies accompanied Shultz on all trips outside Washington, D.C., and reported back to Platt, who made notes of those reports. In addition, Platt had a close working relationship with Hill, who regularly reported to Platt what had occurred in Shultz's meetings outside the department; Platt also made notes of these reports. Platt also took notes in other meetings he attended and of significant information he acquired throughout the day. Platt created over 4,500 pages of daily handwritten notes from January 2, 1985, through February 12, 1987.4 2 Ibid.; Platt, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony, 7/24/87, p. 35 (hearing on nomination to be United States Ambassador to the Philippines); Platt, FBI 302, 4/5/91, pp. 1-2. 3 E.g. Platt, FBI 302, 7/14/87, p. 1; Ibid., 4/5/91, p. 2; Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 65. 4 Platt Notes, 1/2/85-2/12/87, ALW 0034815-9618. Hill had served as the department's executive secretary prior to Platt. Thereafter, as Shultz's executive assistant from summer 1984 until the end of the Reagan Administration in January 1989, Hill's formal role was to write speeches and keep a record of Shultz's activities. In practice, Hill was one of Shultz's closest advisers and his principal gatekeeper. Hill regularly traveled with Shultz and, with few exceptions, attended and kept a handwritten record of Shultz's meetings in the department. In addition, Shultz regularly reported to Hill significant information he received and meetings he attended outside of Hill's presence, both to get Hill's reaction to the information and to permit Hill to record it in his notebooks.5 Shultz, who characterized Hill's notes as a ``remorselessly precise record and a vivid picture'' after using them to write his recent memoirs,6 consistently stated that Hill's notes were accurate.7 During the period January 1984 through December 1987, Hill filled more than 50 stenographer's notebooks with detailed, often verbatim, daily notes of Shultz's meetings, statements and activities. 5 Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 4-5, 142-45. 6 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (Chas. Scribers Sons 1993), p. xiii. 7 E.g., Shultz, OIC Interview, 12/11/90, p. 6 (describing Hill's notebooks as ``a useful managerial tool'' to Shultz as Secretary of State). The two State Department components with primary responsibility for the Middle East and counterterrorism were the Bureau of Near Eastern and Asian Affairs (NEA) and the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning (S/CT). Throughout 1985 and 1986, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy headed NEA and Arnold L. Raphel served as his principal deputy. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley headed the counterterrorism office during 1985 through September 1986; his principal deputy was Parker Borg. These nine senior officials -- Shultz, Whitehead, Armacost, Platt, Hill, Murphy, Raphel, Oakley and Borg -- together with a very few assistants, appear to have been the only State Department officials with significant contemporaneous knowledge of U.S. and Israeli contacts with Iranians and arms shipments to Iran during 1985 and 1986. Among that group, Armacost, Raphel and Oakley constituted what one participant called a ``floating directorate'' that monitored this activity, principally through contacts outside the department, and reported any significant developments to Shultz, often through Platt and Hill.8 8 Ross, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 4. Department of State Evidence of Iran Arms Shipments: The Notes The best evidence of Department of State knowledge of U.S. dealings with Iran comes from Hill and Platt's notes. It was their job to bring important information to the attention of Shultz and to communicate to others his guidance and questions. Both Hill and Platt took minute-by-minute notes that document this exchange of information in remarkably detailed fashion. Notes taken by three other department officials supplement Platt and Hill's notes. Platt's deputy Kenneth M. Quinn took detailed notes of information he received from or passed on to Platt. Christopher W.S. Ross, the principal deputy to Armacost, took detailed notes of information he received from or passed to Armacost. Arnold Raphel took less detailed, but still valuable, notes of significant information he received. The notes of these five officials -- Hill, Platt, Quinn, Ross and Raphel -- were particularly important to Independent Counsel's investigation because State Department officials committed so little about the Iran arms transfers to formal documents.9 With the exception of a few cables and memoranda, almost everything significant that Independent Counsel was able to learn about the Department of State's role in the Iran initiative came from these handwritten notes. 9 Although Ross was a prolific notetaker and produced a typed transcript of his relevant handwritten notes to Iran/contra investigators during 1987, he was unable to locate notes dated earlier than November 18, 1985. (Ross, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 1; DAMASCUS 02366, 3/30/92, ALW 0054999.) During 1992, the OIC reviewed Ross's collection of handwritten notes and confirmed the completeness of his December 1986 production of transcribed relevant entries. The Department of State's Production of Evidence During 1986 and 1987 On November 28, 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese III wrote a letter to Shultz requesting that department information ``be segregated and held for review by and transmission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) upon its request.'' 10 Meese's request applied to 10 Letter from Meese to Shultz, 11/28/86, ALV 004590-91. [a]ny and all material of any kind, type, or description, including, but not limited to, all memoranda, briefing materials, minutes, handwritten notes, diaries, telephone logs, . . . files and other documents of the . . . State Department, . . . from 1 January 1985 to the present, concerning the following: 1. All arms activities involving Iran; 2. All hostage negotiations or similar communications involving arms as an inducement; 3. All financial aid activities involving the Nicaraguan resistance movement which are related to Iran or Israel; [and] 4. All activities of Robert C. McFarlane, . . . Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter . . . relating to 1-3 above.11 11 Ibid. In response to the Meese request, the Department of State's Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Donald J. Bouchard sent a memorandum the next day to the senior official in each department component that potentially would possess relevant information, including Hill and Platt.12 The Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum, which the Department of Justice had reviewed and approved before it was issued at State,13 distributed a copy of Meese's letter to each of these persons, reported that the President had ordered the Department of Justice investigation and stated that ``[t]he Secretary has pledged full Department cooperation. . . .'' The memorandum stated that, with regard to the phrase ``All arms activities involving Iran'' in the Meese letter, the department was interpreting this request, 12 Memorandum from Sofaer and Bouchard to Platt (S/S), Grossman (D), Ross (P), Boyce (T), Abrams (ARA), Murphy (NEA), Holmes (PM), Abramowitz (INR), Bremer (S/CT) and Lamb (DS), cc: Hill (S), Subject: Search for Documents, 11/29/86, ALV 004587-89. 13 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 4/6/92, pp. 4, 16-17. [b]ased upon consultation with the FBI, . . . to encompass any materials concerning allegations or evidence of U.S. or U.S.-authorized arms shipments to Iran, requests by Iran for arms or alleged offers by the U.S., Israel, or other parties allegedly acting on behalf of the U.S. to supply arms.14 14 Memorandum from Sofaer and Bouchard to Platt (S/S), et al., Subject: Search for Documents, 11/29/86, ALV 004587. The memorandum also instructed that, with regard to named individuals such as McFarlane, North and Poindexter, ``[y]ou should . . . provide information of any alleged activities [by them]. . . .'' 15 The memorandum, which stated twice that the Meese request covered handwritten notes,16 directed those addressed to transmit copies of responsive documents to the department's information coordinator by December 3, 1986, and to hold the original documents in their offices pending the conclusion of the investigation.17 15 Ibid., ALV 004588 (emphasis added). 16 Ibid. (``Please note that the request defines documents which are subject to production most broadly to include handwritten notes, diaries, and telephone logs of Department officials. . . . It is not necessary to retrieve documents that were directed to the central information system. . . . However, any . . . personal notes . . . must be produced''). 17 Ibid., ALV 004588-89. The memorandum also directed that, ``[i]f you have any question as to whether a particular document is responsive, you should forward it. L [Office of the Legal Adviser] will make the final determination of responsiveness.'' (Ibid., ALV 004589.) On December 3, Shultz took note of the document request in a letter to Meese: Dear Ed: Your letter of November 28 requested that this Department segregate and hold for review by and transmission to the FBI various documents of potential relevance to your ongoing investigation. I wish to assure you personally of this Department's full cooperation as you pursue this highly important task. In response to your request, we immediately ordered production of all documents requested. . . . Our goal is to have the requested materials in the hands of the FBI by the end of this week. The Legal Adviser and his staff have been in close touch with the FBI investigators and will continue to provide them full cooperation and assistance as the investigation proceeds. Sincerely yours, /s/ George 18 18 Letter from Shultz to Meese, 12/3/86, ALV 011058. Hill -- who had reviewed his notebooks after the revelations of early November 1986 and located numerous notes regarding Iran, hostages, McFarlane, North and possible arms shipments 19 -- began to review his notebooks again after receiving the Meese request and the Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum.20 On December 2, 1986, Hill noted, in red pen, that ``CH [Charles Hill] wkg [working] full-time on notebooks for FBI re Polecat,'' 21 a term used by Hill to describe arms-for-hostages deals with Iran.22 Hill also received a report that afternoon from Sofaer, who had met with the FBI to discuss the sensitivity of Hill's notes and how their production could be avoided: 19 E.g. Hill, OIC Interview, 2/21/92, pp. 18-19, 21; accord Hill Note, 11/8/86, ANS 0001743-44 (``g008CH bfs (S) [Charles Hill briefs Shultz] on all details of g008Polecat. . . . Arf [Raphel] knows more than this chronology[.] CH -- . . . does chronology of what g008we told since May '85'') (emphasis in original); Hill Note, 11/9/86, ANS0001748. (``g008(S) = CH [Shultz meeting with Charles Hill] 0915 at [Shultz's] house (upstairs study)[.] CH -- (hands over 3 papers -- Chron [Chronology] of what we knew since May '85, . . .'') (emphasis in original); Hill Note, 11/10/86, ANS 0001756 (``g008from CH [Charles Hill] notebooks''). 20 On December 1, 1986, Hill made a note, and told Shultz, that the topic of Brunei's $10 million contribution to the contras was ``g008not w/I [within] the purview of what they asked for in this investigation.'' (Hill Note, 12/1/86, ANS 0001941, emphasis in original). Hill made another note to the same effect the next day, and again passed the information to Shultz. (Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 001946.) Hill's notes suggest that he read the Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum closely. 21 Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 0001946. 22 Both Platt and Hill were evasive about the origin and meaning of the term ``Polecat,'' which appears throughout their notes as a reference to arms-for-hostages proposals and developments. (See Hill, Grand Jury, 7/10/92 pp. 39-41, ``That is what Platt and I began to call this whole thing because we associated it with Oliver North. I believe Platt made this name up. North equaled Pole . . . and Polecat was something that kind of smelled. . . . It was whatever Oliver North and McFarlane were up to.''); cf. Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 46 (``That [Polecat] was Charlie Hill's characterization, I think.''). Platt's principal deputies from 1985 each confirmed that ``Polecat'' was a derogatory term for Oliver North personally (North -- North Pole -- Polecat) and referred to the arms-for-hostages aspects of North's counterterrorism activities. (Quinn, FBI 302, 12/4/91, pp. 2-3; Brunson McKinley, FBI 302, 12/13/91, p. 3.) For a time in late 1985, Hill replaced ``Polecat'' in his notes with the less pejorative term ``Night Owl.'' R/O [Readout] g008Abe [Sofaer] g008= [meeting with] g008CH [Charles Hill] . . . Abe mtg w [meeting with] FBI. * * * On g008Polecat notes, I [Sofaer] sd [said] parts sensitive, + probl [problem] of coherence in context. (S) [Shultz] wd [would] prefer to meet w [with] Dir. Webs [FBI Director William Webster] + go thru story w him orally. They accepted that + will let us know tomorrow what Dir. [Director Webster] says.23 23 Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 001946. Hill's note indicates that he passed this information to Shultz. Ibid. (symbol of arrow pointing to the right with a star at the end of the arrow and a vertical line through the shaft of the arrow); accord Hill, OIC Interview, 7/9/92, pp. 8-9 (explaining meaning of the symbol). Later that afternoon, Hill wrote, underlined and circled: ``g008CH [Charles Hill] Reemerges from Notebook research on Polecat.'' 24 24 Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 0001947. Hill continued his notebook review the next day. At the top of his first page of December 3 notes, Hill wrote and circled, ``CH [Charles Hill] works on Notebook Research.'' 25 Hill also received Sofaer's report that the FBI had determined that one agent would need to see Hill's notes: 25 Ibid., 12/3/86, ANS 0001953. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** BOX HEAD *** *** BOX HEAD *** *** BOX HEAD *** *** BOX HEAD *** -------------------------------------------------------------------- ..........g008CH Notes .....g008Abe = CH1220.....Dir Webst [FBI Director Webster] doesnt want to get personally involved. One guy wd [would] go over docs [documents] w CH [Charles Hill]. Tell you what he needs + leave the rest.26 -------------------------------------------------------------------- Hill immediately reported this proposed arrangement to Shultz, who replied, ``ok, good.'' 27 26 Ibid., ANS 0001955. 27 Ibid. On Thursday, December 4, 1986, Hill provided the notes he had selected from his review to three FBI special agents who met at State with him and Michael G. Kozak, the principal deputy legal adviser.28 Hill told the agents that he had searched his handwritten notes and other records that were available to him in the secretary's office and located a set of documents pertinent to the Iran/contra arms controversy.29 Hill provided the agents a chronological set of 65 photocopied pages.30 The documents Hill provided consisted of excerpted entries (some of which also were partially redacted) from 32 pages of his own notebooks; three excerpted notes by Platt dated November 19, 1985; and cables and other Department of State documents.31 Hill did not state to the FBI agents that he had more relevant material, that he had not had time to review all of his notebooks, or that this production was the result of a partial review of the notebooks. FBI Special Agent Danny O. Coulson understood that Hill was providing everything he had that was relevant to Iran/contra within the parameters of Attorney General Meese's November 28, 1986, letter to Shultz.32 28 Hill, FBI 302 (Special Agent Beane), 12/4/86. 29 Ibid., p. 1. 30 See Ibid. (attached photocopies). Hill wrote the date of each incompletely dated or undated document on the upper right-hand corner of each photocopied page. 31 Ibid., pp. 1-5 (itemizing the documents produced). 32 Memorandum from FBI Special Agent Michael S. Foster re: Coulson/OIC Meeting, 3/5/92, pp. 1-2, 027774. Pursuant to Sofaer's discussion with FBI Director William H. Webster, Hill also met privately on December 4, 1986, with Coulson, who was the senior FBI agent assigned to the Iran/contra investigation.33 During this interview, Hill said that he possessed notes he had taken of his conversations with Shultz regarding arms sales to Iran. Hill stressed that these notes, which represented confidential conversations between Cabinet officers and the President, were extremely sensitive and asked Coulson to disseminate the notes only to individuals with an absolute ``need to know.'' Hill then disclosed that these notes related in part to the December 7, 1985, meeting of President Reagan, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Shultz, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and CIA Deputy Director John N. McMahon regarding selling arms to Iran.34 After walking Coulson through the documents, which contained explosive statements attributed to President Reagan,35 Hill provided copies of five photocopied pages to the FBI: one page of typed talking points that had been prepared for Shultz's use at the December 7, 1985, meeting; excerpted entries from three pages of Hill's December 7 notes; and one page with two excerpted notes by Platt dated December 7.36 In his own notes, Hill subsequently made this account of the interview: 33 Hill, FBI 302 (Special Agent Coulson), 12/4/86. 34 Ibid., p. 1. 35 Coulson's interview report states that, [a]t the December 7, 1985 meeting, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of State Shultz and Donald Regan opposed sale of arms to Iran as being illegal. . . . During this meeting President Reagan indicated that the American people would not understand if four hostages died because ``I wouldn't break the law.'' *** During the course of this meeting the President indicated that ``they can impeach me if they want, visiting days are Wednesday.'' Weinberger indicated ``you will not be alone.'' (Ibid., pp. 1-2.) 36 Ibid. (attachments); ALW 0059585-88 (``original'' photocopied handwritten Hill and Platt notes provided by Hill to FBI on December 4, 1986; each page is dated by Hill in red pen in upper right hand corner). g008CH [Charles Hill] g008= [meeting with] g008FBI 1030-1300Reads g008Polecat Record -- Parts on P [Presidential] conversations (Dec 6, 7, 1985) read to sr. [senior] agent only, who will discuss w the Director. -- Asked for nothing to take away. -- astounded at the detail of fact. Much that was new to them. -- said, personally, ``g008if only the WH [White House] had taken the (S) [Secretary's] advice.'' 37 37 Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 0001966. Hill later received a report of the reactions that the FBI agents had expressed to Kozak after their meeting with Hill: y [you] impressed the hell out of them . . . one FBI sd [said] to Kozak[:] ``I deal w [with] murderers, rapists, terrorists + the scum of the earth and I'm a pretty thick skinned guy -- but when I hear what those guys in the WH [White House] did to the Sec of State -- as a citizen -- I'm furious.'' (Ibid., 12/4/86, ANS 0001968.) Two weeks later, the senior FBI agent met again with Hill to discuss these documents. Hill clarified that his notes resulting from the December 7, 1985, White House meeting were based on a general conversation and then a more detailed meeting with Shultz; Hill identified Platt as the author of the other notes Hill had produced on December 4; and Hill stated that Platt's note marked ``from Rich'' reflects information that Weinberger gave to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, who in turn reported Weinberger's comments to Platt. (Hill, FBI 302, 12/18/86; accord, Hill Note, 12/18/87, ANS 0002073: ``1415 -- g008Colson [sic] = [meeting with] CH [Charles Hill] (Just to ask CH to explain relationship betw [between] the various R/O's [read outs] of the Dec 7 '85 mtg + the tp [talking points] prepared for it.[)]''.) Later on the afternoon of December 4, 1986, Sofaer told Hill that the FBI wanted to take possession of his original notes regarding the Brunei solicitation,38 but added that Kozak would try to make alternative arrangements: 38 At this time, there was substantial concern among Department of State officials such as Abrams, Sofaer and Hill (who knew that Brunei had contributed $10 million to the contras but that North had claimed it never arrived) that North had absconded with the Brunei money. -- Webster wants orig [original] notes + wd [would] lock up for indep. counsel. Kozak will work for giving copies + CH [Charles Hill] showing originals on request.39 39 Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 0001968. Hill later told Shultz that ``Webster wants orig [original] pages of notebooks. -- but that wd [would] destroy `best evidence' on g008other issues (2 sided pages) in order to get `best evidence' for g008this [Brunei] issue.'' (Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 001970, emphasis in original.) Hill, who graduated from law school but never practiced, recalled the ``best evidence rule'' from ``a case in [his law school] Evidence course.'' (Ibid.) Hill also wrote some reflections that day on the process of reviewing his notebooks in response to the Meese request and the Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum: -- g008Polecat Reviewing the notebooks for the 4th time Like rereading g008Paradise Lost; each time something new seems to appear -- not new evidence, but new interpretations impress themselves on you. The impression now shining through is that the key figures were . . . [Michael Ledeen and North]. So 2 activists -- one policy driven, one operationally driven [ -- ] play on the flaws of 2 leaders: -- McF's [McFarlane's] megalomania -- P's [President Reagan's] humanitarian spirit 40 40 Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 0001970-71. In April 1987, the OIC transmitted its omnibus document request to the Department of State. This request, which covered the period January 1, 1983, to the present, specifically called for the production of all ``notes'' prepared or maintained by Hill and Platt on subjects including the sale, shipment or transfer of military arms to Iran.41 On May 28, 1987, the Office of the Legal Adviser produced various photocopied documents in response to the OIC request. One set of documents, which includes a number of excerpted Hill notebook entries, was a slightly expanded version of the chronological set of document copies that Hill had provided to the FBI special agents on December 4, 1986: It included copies of excerpts from 34 pages of his own notebooks and five excerpted notes by Platt.42 A second set of documents consists of excerpted Platt notes, including 18 photocopied pages of excerpted notes regarding Iran that Platt had provided to Sofaer's office in December 1986.43 41 Letter from Geoffrey S. Stewart to Michael Kozak, Deputy Legal Adviser, 4/23/87. 42 ALV 001577-1680. 43 ALV 002710-40. In early 1988, the Department of State also provided to the OIC a copy of the set of Hill's November and December 1986 ``post-revelation'' notes, which had been provided to the Senate Select Iran/contra Committee in 1987.44 44 Hill Notes, 11/3/86-12/31/86, ALW 021109-430 (set of photocopied, redacted pages selected from Hill's notebooks that was provided to the Senate Select Committee by the Department of State in 1987; produced by State to the OIC on January 20, 1988). OIC Acquires Additional Department of State Evidence During 1990 and 1991 In 1990, the OIC requested and received Hill's permission to review his original notebooks covering the period 1983 through the end of the Reagan Administration in January 1989, and to photocopy all entries relevant to the continuing Iran/contra investigation.45 At the time, Independent Counsel's investigation was focused on support for the Nicaraguan contras and the activities and statements of sub-Cabinet officials such as Elliott Abrams, Duane R. Clarridge, Alan D. Fiers, Jr. and Donald P. Gregg. Neither Shultz nor Hill was a subject of the OIC's investigation. The 1990 review of Hill's notebooks resulted in the OIC keeping copies of a much greater volume of relevant notes than the Department of State had produced in response to OIC and congressional requests in 1986 and 1987.46 The OIC continued to assume the accuracy of Shultz's well-known testimony regarding his exclusion from information regarding arms shipments to Iran and his (and Hill's) seeming cooperation with each Iran/contra investigation. When Shultz and Hill were reinterviewed at the end of 1990, the OIC remained focused upon the subjects of its investigation at that time: Abrams, Clarridge and Gregg. 45 Hill made his notebooks available to the OIC for its review off-site, first during June 1990 in a secure facility at the Hoover Institution library in Stanford, California, and then during July and August 1990 in a secure section of the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. The OIC reviewed these documents anew, identifying and copying all relevant items. It was not until much later that the OIC compared its selection to Hill's original production of relevant notes. 46 Most of the ``new'' Hill notes that the OIC identified and photocopied in 1990 fell into two categories. Some notes address the plethora of specific topics concerning the Nicaraguan contras (including strategy for obtaining contra aid from Congress, regional diplomatic activity and contra financial analyses) that the OIC had agreed to exclude from its request for relevant Hill notes in 1987. Other notes were created during the period April 24, 1987, through January 20, 1989, which was outside the scope of the OIC's previous requests for relevant Hill notes. The OIC accordingly was not troubled to find these notes when it reviewed Hill's notebooks in July 1990. On April 5, 1991, the OIC also interviewed Nicholas Platt as part of its continuing investigations of Clarridge, Abrams and Gregg.47 Platt described his notetaking practices as executive secretary and said that, although he already had reviewed his notes for any relevant Iran/contra material and turned the relevant notes over to both Congress and the OIC, his complete notes were in a safe deposit box at a local bank, and the OIC was welcome to review them and duplicate them as necessary.48 The following Monday, an FBI special agent took custody of Platt's original notes for the period January 1985 through February 1987.49 In May 1991, after a brief review of Platt's original handwritten notes revealed that they were highly relevant to the continuing Iran/contra investigation, the OIC requested and obtained Platt's permission to copy his entire collection of notes.50 The OIC returned Platt's original notes later in 1991.51 47 Platt, FBI 302, 4/5/91, pp. 4-9. This interview, which the OIC had requested months earlier, had been deferred until Platt, who was serving as United States ambassador to the Philippines at the time, was in Washington for regular consultations. 48 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 49 Ibid., 4/8/91, p. 1. 50 Letter from John Q. Barrett to Ambassador Platt, 5/28/91, 016491; Letter from Ambassador Platt to Barrett, 6/5/91, 016596. 51 Platt, FBI 302, 9/24/91, p. 1. It was not until the summer and fall of 1991, in connection with the accelerating investigations of Abrams and several CIA officials, that the OIC realized that Hill's notes were inconsistent with Shultz's testimony. Further investigation revealed that Hill had not produced these notes in 1986 or 1987, and that Platt had not produced corresponding notes of many of the same events. The OIC later obtained notes from other Department of State officials that also had not been produced to Iran/contra investigators.52 52 For example, in 1991 and 1992, the OIC located for the first time handwritten meeting and reminder notes that had been created contemporaneously by three junior foreign service officers (Glyn Davies, Keith Eddins and Debi Graze) who served as special assistants to Shultz during 1986-87. Although these notes were largely cumulative, repeating much information that Hill, Platt, Ross, Quinn and/or Raphel had recorded in their notes, they occasionally contained substantive information that was not recorded in any other document. These notes were not produced earlier because the Department of State failed to advise the special assistants that they had been requested. (Eddins, FBI 302, 1/28/91, p. 6; Graze, FBI 302, 8/27/92, p. 3.) When contacted directly by the OIC in 1991-92, each special assistant promptly and voluntarily provided the requested material. Shultz's ``Three Phases'' of Department of State Knowledge Regarding Arms Shipments to Iran Starting with his earliest closed-session testimony before Congress on December 16, 1986, Shultz characterized his knowledge of the Iran arms shipments in three phases: from June to November 1985, when he said he knew arms sales were debated but was not informed that any took place; from December 1985 to May 1986, when he said he knew the United States was attempting to open a dialogue with Iran but was unwilling to sell arms; and from May 4 to November 3, 1986, when he received no information of arms transfers. In essence, Shultz's testimony centered more on what he did not know than on what he did; it laid the groundwork for the widely held misperception that he and other Department of State officials were largely ignorant of the Iran arms shipments. Shultz's testimony -- which was prepared by Hill and Sofaer, and reviewed by Platt -- specifically characterized the development of the Iran initiative, and his knowledge of the initiative, as follows: The following chronology would fail to give the full picture as I saw it if I did not note at the outset that this year-and-a-half-long episode involving contacts with Iran seems to me in retrospect to have taken place in three phases: an initial period from June until November 1985 when arms transfers were periodically debated as part of an effort to improve relations with Iran and secure the release of our hostages -- during this period I learned of two proposed arms transfers, but was not informed that either was consummated; a middle period, from December '85 to May '86, during which I had strong evidence that we were trying to open a dialogue with Iran but were unwilling to sell arms; and a third phase, from May 4, 1986, when I heard of a discussion in London about arms transfers and protested to the White House, until the revelations in the media beginning November 3, 1986 -- during this period I received no information indicating that an arms transfer to Iran had occurred.53 53 Shultz, SSCI Testimony, 12/16/86, pp. 6-7 (emphasis added); accord, Shultz, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Testimony, 1/21/87, pp. 13-14; Shultz, Tower Commission Testimony, 1/22/87, pp. 8-9. In 1992, Shultz explained that it had been his thinking that the ``three phases'' construct just made the account more understandable and easier to describe. The phases were characterized, I believe, by if a phase came to an end and I concluded for one reason or another that the effort to sell arms to Iran had stopped, so that ended the phase. (Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 37.) Although Shultz had abandoned the ``three phases'' organizational scheme by the time he gave public testimony before the Select Committees in July 1987, the substance of his testimony was largely unchanged and he did, on one occasion, resurrect ``three time periods'' in response to a specific question. (Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/24/87, pp. 87-93.) He also told the Select Committees at the beginning of his testimony that he would make no opening statement because Congress had his prior Iran/contra testimony and what he had to say was ``basically the same testimony. So I don't choose to read it out again.'' (Ibid., 7/23/87, p. 2.) The evidence contained in contemporaneous notes supports the thesis that Shultz and others in the department opposed the initiative. But it does not support the commonly accepted corollary: that they were prevented from monitoring the initiative. In fact, Shultz and his senior officials did monitor the initiative. As a result, Shultz and other top department officials had a far better understanding of the initiative than their testimony suggests. Moreover, significant aspects of Shultz's testimony were incorrect: Shultz learned in ``phase one'' that arms had been shipped; Shultz repeatedly complained during ``phase two'' that arms were still on the table; and there is strong evidence that, during ``phase three,'' Shultz learned in both late May and late July that arms had been shipped to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages. The evidence shows that Shultz's characterization of each of the three phases set out in his testimony was incorrect: Shultz and others in the department were substantially better informed during each of the three phases than he stated. Phase One: ``from June until November 1985 . . . I learned of two proposed arms transfers, but was not informed that either was consummated'' As Shultz told Congress, he learned during 1985 of two proposed transfers of U.S. arms to Iran: the Israeli TOW missile shipments planned for August and September, and the Israeli HAWK missile shipment planned for November. He did not admit knowledge that either was consummated. Contemporaneous notes taken by both Platt and Hill show that Shultz and other senior Department officials received information indicating that the transfers had taken place. These notes corroborate McFarlane's contention that he had kept Shultz and others informed about the Iran initiative. Hill's notes reflect that McFarlane informed Shultz (who was traveling in Australia) by a ``back channel'' cable transmitted on July 14, 1985, that he (McFarlane) had been advised by an Israeli emissary of contacts with Iranians who were confident that they cld [could] achieve the release of the 7 hostg [hostages]. They sought some gain in return: 100 TOWS from Israel -- but the larger purpose wld [would] be the opening of the private dialogue w [with] a high level American official and a sustained discussion of US-Iranian relations[.] 54 54 Hill Note, 7/14/85, ANS 0001109 (emphasis deleted); Back Channel Cable from McFarlane to Shultz (unnumbered), 7/14/85, ALV 005092-95. Shultz directed Hill to ``do a cautiously positive reply to say ok.'' 55 Shultz, by cable transmitted later that day, told McFarlane that he (Shultz) agreed 55 Hill Note, 7/14/85, ANS 0001109. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. that we should make a tentative show of interest without commitment. . . . That being said, I further agree with you that this situation is loaded with ``imponderables'' that call for great caution on our part. . . . I would only underscore a couple of them: the fraud that seems to accompany so many deals involving arms and Iran. . . . I suggest . . . that we give the emissary a positive but passive reply. That is tell him that he may convey to his Iranian contacts that the U.S. has been informed of the Iranian proposal and is receptive to the idea of a private dialogue involving a sustained discussion of U.S.-Iranian relations. In other words, we are willing to listen and seriously consider any statement on this topic they may wish to initiate. . . .56 56 SECTO 13108, 7/14/85, ALW 001132-34. Shultz followed up after he returned to Washington on July 19, 1985.57 Hill made a note that Shultz should ``check w[ith] Bud'' McFarlane about 57 Shultz Record of Schedule, 7/19/85, ALW 0048791. * ``Emissary'' from Israel re Israel-Iran contact to help w[ith] A. 7 hostages B. moderates in post-Khomeini Iran (Gorbanefar) [sic] 58 58 Hill Note, 7/23/85, ANS 0001140. Shultz also discussed this topic at a ``wrap up'' meeting with his senior aides late the next day. (Hill Note, 7/24/85, ANS 0001141.) Hill made another note two days later that Shultz should ``check out'' this matter with McFarlane. (Hill Note, 7/26/85, ANS 0001143.) On August 5, 1985, Hill made a note indicating that he told Shultz to ask McFarlane ``tonight at 6 pm'' about ``Peres + Isr [Israel]/Iran intel [intelligence] link[.]'' (Hill Note, 8/5/85, ANS 0001152.) None of these notes was produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. On August 6, Hill took detailed notes of Shultz's ``read out,'' or recounting, of his conversation with McFarlane regarding the ``Israel-Iran link:'' 3 mtgs [meetings] betw [between] Israelis + 2 or 3 from Iran (Hamburg + Tel Aviv) Bud's contact is [Israeli official David] Kimche. Was in DC on weekend. Irans [Iranians] sees IR [Iran] in shambles. See new govt as inevitable. Mil [military] + people still pro-American. Want a dialogue w [with] Amers [Americans]. Want arms from us. Want 100 TOWS from Israel. All totally deniable. Say they can produce 4 or more of hostg [hostages]. Want a meeting somewhere. So Bud is pursuing it. Shamir told Kimche he wanted to know explicitly whether I informed. Kimche sd [said] Murf [Murphy] mtg [with Syria] scares them.59 59 Hill Note, 8/6/85, ANS 0001154. Hill also noted his own response to Shultz's report, and Shultz's ultimate response to McFarlane: g008CH [Charles Hill] to (S) [Shultz] We are being had. Isr [Israel] desperate for a big arms trade rel [relationship] w [with] Iran that US permits. They have finally hit on the way to do it. (S): its a mistake. I sd [said] it had to be stopped 60 60 Ibid. On September 4, 1985, Platt noted information -- which he labeled as a matter that had lots of ``juice'' 61 -- about Shultz-McFarlane discussions and ``equipment'' shipments to Iran in exchange for hostages: 61 Platt Note, 9/4/85, ALW 0036258. Platt's deputy said Platt used the term ``juice'' to refer to anything that was ``especially interesting.'' (Quinn, FBI 302, 12/4/91, p. 3.) -- Juice -- O [Oliver North] -- Bud [McFarlane] -- Ledeen -- Back channels Israel-Iran -- would produce 7 hostages[.] Kimche. g722Israel Israelis g722produce said they could produce -- Because Iranians wanted equipment. Past 2 days -- sidebar conversations w Bud + S [Shultz] -- How to move them -- numbers, etc. . . . -- This AM Bud said to S -- Deal is -- They'll move seven hostages to beach . . . -- Ollie North will go out + arrange. He needs a fake passport -- g722will get We have one.62 62 Platt Note, 9/4/85, ALW 0036258-59. On September 11, 1985, Hill noted his awareness that these exchanges would leave the United States with an obligation to replenish ``arms'' to Israel: Bud [McFarlane] wkg [working] on 7 hstgs [hostages]. Don't stir it up. Its independent from Syrian effort. Iran-Israel. Shd [Should] be worked thru by end of week. (Scam on us) They [Iran] giving us what wld [would] anyway [hostages] (for Atlit [prisoners in Israel]) + then give us a bill for arms for IR [Iran] from Israel.63 63 Hill Note, 9/11/85, ANS 0001117. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. On the evening of September 14, 1985, the balance of the Israeli TOW shipment went to Iran and Reverend Benjamin Weir was released. The next day, Platt made a note, based on a call from Oakley (who had just spoken with North) that ``Polecat [is] beginning to Pay off -- Weir has been released. . . . Other things could happen.'' 64 On September 16, Hill's first note of the day recorded his understanding of events: 64 Platt Note, 9/15/85, ALW 0036343. Weir released + taken to CIA [facility] in Va. Secret because op. [operation] still going on. Oakley working w Ollie [North]. McF [McFarlane] + Ollie are getting us into deal where we will have to pay off Isr [Israel], IR [Iran] and Syr [Syria] for what we wd [would] get from Syria for nothing following Atlit release.65 65 Hill Note, 9/16/85, ANS 0001123. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. On September 17, 1985, Weir's release became public and both Platt and Hill's notes reflect numerous discussions about the release. They both noted an early morning telephone call between Hill and Reginald Bartholomew, the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon.66 Bartholomew, who had not been informed of any of the arms-for-hostages proposals leading up to Weir's release,67 told Hill that ``all signs are we g008didn't get Weir from Syria. As for others (IR [Iran], Isr [Israel] etc) I have no info.'' 68 Bartholomew, from his position outside the circle of knowledge in Washington, said it was his feeling that ``Weir was let out to g722put bring letters + put pressure on us to release the Dawa prisoners [in Kuwait].'' 69 Since then, Shultz has used Bartholomew's uninformed speculation that Weir was released to deliver a message regarding the Dawa prisoners as proof that it was the reason for Weir's release and that Shultz, himself, was unaware of the arms transfers that preceded Weir's release.70 Contrary to Shultz's pretenses, Hill's notes from later in the day on September 17, 1985, show that Shultz did receive indications that arms were involved. 66 Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001125; Platt Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0036354. 67 Bartholomew, FBI 302, 1/2/92, pp. 3-6; Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001125 (``I [Bartholomew] know precious little about origins of this or who is involved. Bud [McFarlane] has told me nothing of who else [is] involved.''). 68 Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001125. 69 Platt Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0036354. The Dawa prisoners held in Kuwait reportedly included a close relative of a key member of the Hezbollah faction that was holding the hostages in Lebanon. (See generally Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 72, 93, 95, 159; Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/13/92, pp. 300-1.) 70 E.g. Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 60-61, 70-73, 77, 79, 90, 113, 115, 172-73. The suggested explanations are not mutually exclusive: The terrorists could have decided to free Weir after Iran received TOW missiles from the West, and they could have told Weir that the remaining hostages would suffer unless he communicated the terrorists' demand that Kuwait free the Dawa prisoners. On the day that Weir's release was announced, NBC News had a story about an airplane that had run into trouble on its flight back to Israel after delivering arms to Iran. Hill noted on September 17, 1985: NBC -- Isr. [Israeli] arms to g722arms Iran. DC-8 flew from Iran to Isr [Israel]. Isr sd yes, but elec. + commo [electrical and communications] failure. Story is Iran Jews on board. Plane picking up spare parts. Kimche met in London in last month w [with] NSC official. + arrangements made. US interested in leverage w Iran mil. (ingratiating) over what comes after Khomeini. (false) Kashoggi [sic] + Nimrodi.71 71 Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001126. Hill marked this note with stars and the symbol ``H),'' which indicated that he regarded the information as ``interesting.'' This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. The Department of State apparently learned of NBC's information through a telephone call from NBC reporter Chris Wallace to Raphel on September 17, 1985. (See Raphel Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0062116-17; same information as Hill's 9/17/85 note; Raphel Chronology, 1987, p. 1, ALW 0056726.) A series of State Department cables during this period also referred to the reports of the plane returning to Israel running into trouble over Turkey after delivering weapons to Iran. (See Department of State cable to Beirut, Damascus and London, 9/17/85, ALW 025278-79; MANAMA 02805, 9/19/85, ALW 025287; Department of State cable to all Near East diplomatic posts, Ankara, Paris, London, Rome and Nicosia, 9/19/85, ALW 025282-83; see also ``Rara avis,'' The Economist, 9/21/85, p. 42, ALW 025280; cf. RIYADH 08507, 9/23/85, ALW 025281, reporting front page Al Riyadh story of previous day claiming President Reagan sent U.S. official to Tehran to discuss release of hostages in Lebanon.) Hill noted Shultz's reply: ``Well, sometimes you have to try things.'' Hill's note indicates that he told Shultz The Washington Post had a story that Weir had been released. Hill observed that reporters ``[h]ave not yet put the two [stories] together.'' In the margin of his notebook, he wrote: ``Bud's folly is out.'' 72 72 That same day, Platt made notes of McFarlane's report that the effort to obtain hostages other than Weir ``appears not going anywhere'' and wrote that this activity had turned into a ``[r]ace between Syria to round up hostages so [Classified Country Name Withheld] can pay or Israelis can pay iranians with weapons sales.'' (Platt Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0036360.) On September 20, 1985, after it was clear that no additional hostages would be freed, Shultz stated that he was ``uncomfortable with polecat operations.'' 73 The next day, Shultz, Armacost and Whitehead discussed their concern for the U.S. Government position -- bargaining for hostage release while publicly denying a deal. Hill recorded their discussion in his notebook: 73 Platt Note, 9/20/85, ALW 0036387. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. g008Weir + 6 Hostg [Hostages] Arma [Armacost]: I have anxiety about strange bargaining going on. Iran plane in Israel. (S): I'm not comfortable, don't know what to do about it. When Weir released, lot of people wanted to take credit for it. But looks like they let him go just to propagandize their cause. Arma -- They are being cute w [with] me. Pdx [Poindexter] just says its v [very] confused. I wd be concerned about bargaining w Iran while we say we not doing a deal. (S): WH [White House] has taken control. When they want us to do something they will tell us. JW [Whitehead]: do you tk [think] they tell the P [President]? (S): Yes, But he doesn't appreciate the problems w [with] arms sales to Iran.74 74 Hill Note, 9/21/85, ANS 0001132-33 (original emphasis). This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. In 1993, Armacost acknowledged that during the period surrounding Weir's release, arrangements involving ``giving something for hostages'' were ``going on,'' and Armacost understood that one major component was arms going to Iran.75 Armacost, although not recalling specific discussions, testified that the connection between Israel's dealings with Iran and Weir's release ``surely'' was something that he and Shultz discussed.76 Oakley, who was informed by North that an arms shipment produced Weir's release,77 generally kept Shultz informed by briefing Armacost and Platt.78 Oakley believed that Shultz knew everything that he knew about the Weir release because he had reported his information.79 McFarlane and Poindexter also testified that they informed Shultz about the Israeli shipments preceding the release.80 75 Armacost, Grand Jury, 3/13/92, p. 30. 76 Ibid., p. 43. 77 Oakley, FBI 302, 8/19/87, p. 2; Ibid., 11/13/91, pp. 3, 5; Ibid., 11/14/91, p. 2; accord, Oakley, Tower Commission Interview Notes, 12/17/86, p. 2, ALS 002391. 78 E.g. Ibid. 79 Oakley, FBI 302, 11/14/91, p. 4. 80 E.g. McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/20/92; Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 7/15/87, pp. 180-81. Notes from November and December 1985 corroborate this testimony and reflect the working understanding within the Department of State that the Weir release had, in fact, involved arms transfers to Iran. A note taken by Raphel during a meeting with Armacost, Oakley, Borg and Ross on November 12, 1985, states that ``Iranian/Israeli connection got Weir released.'' 81 81 Raphel Note, 11/12/85, ALW 0062333. Raphel, who died in 1988, was not interviewed regarding this note. An early morning Hill note from November 18 reflects the same understanding. It indicates that Hill and Shultz discussed: McF [McFarlane] + Isr/IR [Israel/Iran] hostg [hostages]. That was attempt to see (S) [Shultz] last night. He thinks something's coming down in next week or so (not for the first time) -- Nothing cld [could] be more (S): its appropriate than a meeting a bad betw [between] [a non-Iranian deal intermediary] + Ollie North. Looney Tunes.82 82 Hill Note, 11/18/85, ANS 0001194. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. The next day, Hill made another note regarding ``Ollie North's hostg [hostage] caper. Ollie telling story (skewed) to Parker Borg. Using [non-Iranian intermediary] (witting) as cover.'' 83 Hill later received a secure telephone call from Platt in Washington, D.C. Platt reported that North told Borg he (North) had stumbled on the Israelis sending arms to Iran as a result of his contra activities. North claimed he ``went to Isr [Israel] + sd [said] we know yr [you're] doing this + we want something for it -- use yr [your] channel to IR [Iran] to get hstg [hostages] out. They thot [thought] all wd [would] come out w [with] Weir. Didn't. Now will try again.'' 84 Hill responded to this account of North's story by stating, ``I think Ollie is lying to try to make the arrangement sound more acceptable. We (he) didn't just stumble on this.'' 85 83 Hill Note, 11/19/85, ANS 0001198. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. 84 Hill Note, 11/19/85, ALW 0058650 (misdated as 11/18/85). This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. 85 Ibid. A memorandum from Oakley sent electronically to Shultz in Geneva on November 18, 1985, states that, [t]hrough other sources and connections, those used for the release of Reverend Weir, there is an expectation of a possible break through on the hostages on November 20 or 21. [Non-Iranian intermediary] was informed of the possibility and urged to be present so he could take credit.86 86 Memorandum from Oakley to Shultz, 11/18/85, ALW 0047963-65. As Shultz has testified, McFarlane informed him in Geneva the next day (November 19, 1985) that the remaining hostages were about to be released following a shipment of 120 HAWKs from Israel to Iran. Oakley's memo and McFarlane's report together told Shultz that the Weir release had involved the same kind of arms-for-hostages deal. Oakley's memorandum stated the ``sources and connections'' who were developing the November 1985 activity were those used for the release of the Reverend Weir. McFarlane's report disclosed these ``sources and connections'' included the Israelis and their arms dealers. The inference from Oakley's memorandum and McFarlane's report, then, is that the Israelis were following the same pattern in November 1985 to obtain the release of the remaining hostages, as they had in obtaining the release of Weir. Notes from discussions leading up to the December 7, 1985, White House meeting of the President with his national security advisers confirm Shultz's and other senior department officials' awareness of the Israeli arms transfers prior to the Weir release. Shultz spoke with Poindexter on December 5, 1985, first by unsecured telephone, then on secure. Shultz reported to Hill that during the first call he (Shultz) told Poindexter, I think we shd [should] say g008stop[.] Syria has indicated to Murf [Assistant Secretary Richard W. Murphy] that Iran [is] playing a big role + they can't influence it much. We are signalling to Iran that they g008can kidnap people for profit.87 87 Hill Note, 12/5/85, ANS 0001227 (emphasis in original). Later, during the secure call, Shultz said, ``This is paying for hostgs [hostages] -- so we have broken our principles.'' 88 The only hostage who had been paid for at that point was Weir, and the only currency that had been discussed was arms. 88 Ibid., ANS 0001229. Hill's notes of Shultz's report of the December 7, 1985, meeting state: They [McFarlane and Poindexter] say Isr [Israel] sent 60 I-hawks [missiles] for release of Weir. Maybe thats why he released + maybe not. [Non-Iranian intermediary] sent back to Beirut so he can get credit for it.89 89 Hill Note, 12/7/85, ANS 0001242; accord generally Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 45 (``I'm not a military person so I always have trouble with TOWs and HAWKs and things like that.''). Hill's note shows that Shultz was informed that arms transfers in fact had been consummated in connection with the release of Weir. Thus, although Shultz stated as recently as February 1992 that he still believed that Weir was released to bring pressure on Kuwait to release the Dawa prisoners, and not because of the Israeli arms shipments, he could not maintain that he was never informed that Israel made arms shipments at or before the time of the Weir release. Before the Select Committees in 1987, Shultz testified that McFarlane had informed Shultz and President Reagan on August 6, 1985, of an Israeli proposal to sell 100 U.S.-supplied TOWs to Iran in return for the release of four Americans held hostage in Beirut.90 Shultz testified that he objected and heard nothing indicating that the transfer had taken place.91 90 Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/23/87, pp. 67-68. Hill's notes do not reflect such a meeting with McFarlane and the President on August 6, 1985. 91 Ibid. Regarding the November 1985 HAWK shipment, numerous notes reflect that Shultz and other senior department officials were informed contemporaneously of many of its details, including discussions prior to the Geneva summit of President Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the flight plan, the need for overflight clearances, the delay in the shipment and the reasons the Iranians eventually returned the missiles. With regard to the November 1985 shipment of HAWKs, Shultz testified to Congress that he knew the shipment was planned, but that he believed that it was never consummated. At first, he believed no arms were actually sent. Later, he understood the shipment had been unsatisfactory and therefore returned. He said: I learned about the -- I learned about the proposed shipment in connection with the hostages, as I described it, in the telephone call in Geneva. But since no hostages were released, I assumed that no arms were sent. I later learned, as I testified, that a shipment went from Israel to Iran but was rejected by Iran and presumably sent back; so as of that time, as far as I knew, no arms had been shipped.92 92 Shultz, HFAC Testimony, 1/21/87, p. 64. The shipment was not in fact sent back to Israel until February 1986. No contem