Walsh Final Report: Chapter 31, Edwin Meese III: November 1986

Walsh Iran / Contra Report - Chapter 31 Edwin Meese III: November 1986 Chapter 31 Edwin Meese III: November 1986 Attorney General Edwin Meese III became directly involved in the Reagan Administration's secret plan to sell weapons to Iran in January 1986, when he was asked for a legal opinion to support the plan.1 When the secret arms sales became exposed in November 1986, raising questions of legality and prompting congressional and public scrutiny, Meese became the point man for the Reagan Administration's effort, in Meese's words, ``to limit the damage.'' 2 1 Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/28/87, pp. 2-9; 21-36. Meese also supported the plan. (Ibid., pp. 5-7.) 2 Meese, North Trial Testimony, 3/28/89, pp. 5747-48. Meese began with an attempt to justify legally President Reagan's failure to notify Congress of the arms sales for more than a year. His efforts led to a November 21-24 fact-finding investigation focused on the President's involvement in the November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran. The Select Iran/contra Committees criticized Meese for departing from ``standard investigative techniques'' in his fact-finding mission because he failed to protect National Security Council documents, many of which were altered or destroyed as he conducted one-on-one interviews with senior Administration officials without taking notes.3 The Select Committees also faulted Meese for ``incorrectly'' stating in his November 25, 1986, press conference, at which he disclosed the Iran/contra diversion, that President Reagan did not learn of the 1985 shipment until February 1986. The Select Committees viewed this as an isolated error. It was not. 3 Select Committees Report, pp. 10-11, pp. 20-21, pp. 306-07, p. 311, pp. 317-18. Meese was conducting the November 21-24 investigation as ``counselor'' and ``friend'' to the President, not as the nation's chief law enforcement officer. Independent Counsel concluded that he was not so much searching for the truth about the November 1985 HAWK shipment, as he was building a case of deniability for his client-in-fact, President Reagan. By this time, Meese knew that the 1985 HAWK transaction, in which the National Security Council staff and the Central Intelligence Agency were directly involved without a presidential covert-action Finding authorizing their involvement, raised serious legal questions. The President was potentially exposed to charges of illegal conduct if he was knowledgeable of the shipment and had not reported it to Congress, under the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and in the absence of a Finding. But Meese apparently never questioned the President himself about whether he approved or knew about the November 1985 HAWK shipment. When Meese got answers in his inquiry that did not support his defense of the President, he apparently ignored them, as he did with Secretary of State George P. Shultz's revelation on November 22 that the President had told him that he had known of the HAWK shipment in advance. In the course of the weekend inquiry, Meese and his aides discovered in the National Security Council Office of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North a politically explosive document: An undated memorandum, apparently drafted in early April 1986, that outlined a planned diversion of $12 million in proceeds from the Iran arms sales to the Nicaraguan contras. This discovery caused the Meese inquiry to veer off onto two tracks -- while facts about the 1985 HAWK shipment were still being gathered, there was a second effort to determine who knew about and who approved the diversion. After receiving confirmation from North that an Iran/contra diversion had occurred, Meese quietly imparted the news to the President, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan and Vice President Bush on November 24, sounding them out privately on their personal knowledge of it. He did not inform a senior advisers' meeting that afternoon. He informed the Cabinet on the next day. Meese attempted to resolve the separate but continuing problem of the HAWK shipment -- particularly the President's contemporaneous knowledge -- at the senior advisers' meeting on Monday, November 24, attended by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Regan, National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter, Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, and CIA Director William J. Casey. In response to a question about the November 1985 HAWK shipment, Poindexter falsely claimed that before December 1985, McFarlane handled the Iran arms sales ``all alone'' with ``no documentation.'' 4 Meese then added that the November 1985 HAWK shipment ``[m]ay be a violation of law if arms shipped w/o a finding. But President did not know.'' 5 At least Meese, President Reagan, Regan, Shultz, Weinberger, Bush, and Poindexter knew that Meese's version was false, but no one spoke up to correct him. After the meeting, Shultz told his aide M. Charles Hill, ``They may lay all this off on Bud [McFarlane] . . . They rearranging the record.'' 6 4 Weinberger Note, 11/24/86, ALZ 0040669LL. 5 Regan Note, 11/24/86, ALU 0139379. 6 Hill Note, 11/24/86, ANS 00001898. Because Congress had already announced its intention to hold hearings on the Iran arms sales, Meese's apparent attempt to signal other Cabinet members that the party line should be that the President did not have contemporaneous knowledge of the November 1985 HAWK shipment required evaluation as an effort to obstruct a congressional inquiry. The OIC did not learn of Meese's statements at the November 24, 1986, meeting until late 1991 and 1992, when it finally obtained notes of the meeting taken by Weinberger and Regan. Six years after the pivotal events had occurred, the trail was cold. With the principals professing no memory of often critical events, the OIC did not uncover sufficient evidence of an obstruction to justify a prosecution. November 1-19, 1986 On November 3, 1986, the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran were first exposed in the press, setting off inquiries that resulted in a series of false denials by the White House. On November 5, 1986, Poindexter asked Meese for some ``legal advice'' on the arms sales to Iran, in anticipation of questions from Congress.7 Two days later, Meese asked Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper, the head of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to research the matter, with assistance from ``one other trusted person.'' 8 Meese told Cooper that NSC counsel Paul Thompson would be his White House contact.9 Cooper understood that he was to research the relevant statutes and to provide an analysis of whether the arms shipments were legal.10 7 Meese, Grand Jury, 12/16/87, pp. 62-66. 8 Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/28/87, pp. 42-43; Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 8-11. 9 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 10 Ibid., pp. 13, 15-16. On the morning of November 10, President Reagan met in the Oval Office with his senior national security advisers, including Meese, Poindexter, Vice President Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Regan, and Poindexter's deputy, Alton Keel, to discuss issuing a public statement on the Iran arms sales. Poindexter gave a presentation on the arms sales to Iran in which he described U.S. involvement as beginning with the January 17, 1986, presidential Finding. He omitted any mention of U.S. approval of or involvement in the 1985 shipments of arms from Israeli stocks. Instead, he asserted falsely that U.S. officials first learned of the 1985 Israeli shipments to Iran when they confronted Israeli officials after discovering a warehouse of U.S.-made arms in Portugal in 1986. According to Poindexter, Israel had responded that they were trying to get Iranian Jews out of Iran.11 11 Hill Note, 11/10/86, ANS 0001762; Regan Note, 11/10/86, ALU 0139114; Keel Note, 11/10/86, AKW 047247. Virtually everyone at the November 10 meeting knew that Poindexter's story was false, but no one spoke up to correct it. President Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, Regan, Vice President Bush, and Casey all knew that at least since June 1985 Israel had proposed selling U.S. arms to Iran in an attempt to free U.S. hostages, not Iranian Jews. They also knew that the Administration had learned about the Israeli efforts directly, not from stumbling on a warehouse of weapons in Portugal. President Reagan, Regan, Shultz, Vice President Bush, and Weinberger all had advance notice of the November 1985 HAWK shipment and its purpose -- to free the hostages. Casey definitely knew within a few days after the shipment and may have known in advance as well. There is no direct evidence that Meese knew about the 1985 shipments prior to this meeting.12 12 Meese denied that a September 1985 TOW missile shipment was discussed at the November 10 meeting and maintained that he did not learn of the 1985 shipments until approximately November 18, when Cooper told him about the NSC chronology. Meese's own notes of the meeting, however, belie his claim: ``508 [TOWs] shipped by Israel -- [U.S.] told after the fact . . . Results: . . . 3 hostages ret'd: Weir, Jako [sic, Jenco] Jacobsen.'' The reference to Weir's release being one of the ``results'' of the shipments is significant because he was released in September 1985. After Poindexter's presentation, the group reviewed a draft press statement prepared by Casey. Poindexter opposed issuing a public statement because it would terminate ongoing negotiations with Iran. Regan urged they issue a statement, because ``we are being hung out to dry'' and ``[o]ur credibility is at stake.'' 13 President Reagan favored a statement emphasizing that the United States had not dealt with terrorists but was pursuing a long-range policy toward Iran.14 Meese wanted the statement to include the assertion that no U.S. laws or policy had been violated, even though he had not yet received any assurance from Cooper, who was still researching the matter.15 Meese testified that as late as November 20, 1985, he was not ``fully informed'' on the legal issues and was relying on Cooper.16 13 Weinberger Memo, 11/10/86, ALZ 0041727. 14 Regan Note, 11/10/86, ALU 0139114; Keel Note, 11/10/86, AKW 047247. 15 Regan Note, 11/10/86, ALU 0139114. 16 Meese, Grand Jury, 12/16/87, p. 112. Meese's prior analysis in January 1986 that the plan was legal was based on his understanding that shipments would be authorized by a Finding signed by the President. Having just been told that in September 1985, weapons were shipped before any Finding, Meese, at that point, had no basis for asserting that no laws had been violated. Even if Israel had shipped the weapons without U.S. approval there would have been a violation of the Arms Export Control Act because the President had failed to report such a third-country the shipment to Congress ``immediately'' after learning of it. Near the end of the meeting, Shultz demanded to know whether there would be further arms sales to Iran. President Reagan responded by insisting that his advisers support the policy and to not say anything else publicly. Shultz replied that he supported the President, but not the policy.17 17 Regan Note, 11/10/86, ALU 0139126; Keel Note, 11/10/86, AKW 047255; Hill Note, 11/10/86, ANS 0001764. The press statement released later that day did not confirm or deny any arms sales to Iran. It simply announced that the President had met with his senior national security advisers to discuss the hostages held in Lebanon, and that no laws had been broken: As has been the case in similar meetings with the President and his senior advisers on this matter, there was unanimous support for the President. While specific decisions discussed at the meeting cannot be divulged, the President did ask that it be reemphasized that no U.S. laws have been or will be violated and that our policy of not making concessions to terrorists remains intact.18 18 White House Press Statement, 11/10/86. When White House Counsel Peter J. Wallison received a copy of the statement he ``was unhappy to note that it said that all laws had been complied with. I was told that this is what the AG [attorney general] wanted said.'' 19 Wallison had previously expressed to Regan his concern that the arms sales may have violated the Arm Export Control Act (AECA). Wallison's efforts to look into the matter had been thwarted, however, by Poindexter's unwillingness to provide him with the facts. 19 Wallison Diary, 11/14/86, ALU 0138220, p. 251. On November 12, 1986, a story in The New York Times questioned the legality of the arms sales to Iran. After learning of the report, Nancy Reagan told Don Regan that she was ``very upset'' by the press reports and that the policy of refusing comment on the arms sales was ``[r]isking presidency.'' 20 Regan testified that as the Iran arms sales continued to dominate the news and the President's approval ratings plummeted, he and other officials were concerned that the scandal would become another Watergate and lead to calls for President Reagan's impeachment.21 20 Regan Note, 11/12/86, ALU 0138701. 21 Regan, Grand Jury, 5/8/92, pp. 98-100. Later on November 12, President Reagan and his top advisers, including Vice President Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Meese, and Poindexter met with Senate leaders Robert Byrd and Robert Dole, House Speaker Jim Wright and Rep. Richard Cheney to brief them on the Iran arms sales.22 According to Regan's notes of the meeting, Poindexter once again provided the false cover story that ``Israel's participation in arms selling led us to discover arms in Portugal which Israel [was] selling to get Jews out of Iran.'' 23 When Sen. Byrd demanded to know when the Administration's contacts with Iran began, Poindexter responded falsely that, although the Administration had begun to explore contacts with Iran in 1985, there had been ``no transfer of material'' before the Finding was signed in January 1986.24 22 Regan Note, 11/12/86, ALU 0139132. 23 Ibid., pp. 4-5, ALU 0139135-36. 24 Ibid., p. 10, ALU 0139141. On November 13, 1986, Cooper gave Meese the memorandum justifying the 1986 arms shipments under the National Security Act. That evening, President Reagan delivered a nationally televised address, purporting to set out the facts of U.S. involvement in the arms sales to Iran. He publicly admitted for the first time that he had authorized ``the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran.'' He insisted, however, that ``[t]hese modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane.'' He denied reports of dissension within the Administration and asserted that ``all appropriate Cabinet officers were fully consulted.'' The President also reiterated his earlier statement that no federal laws had been broken and assured the public that ``the relevant committees of Congress are being, and will be, fully informed.'' He did not mention the 1985 arms sales to Iran.25 25 Transcript of President's Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, 11/13/86, pp. 1546-48. At a meeting that morning to draft the President's address, Poindexter's deputy Alton Keel proposed inserting a sentence that all laws had been complied with. Wallison, who had been researching the question for Regan but was unable to get the facts from Poindexter, stated that the legality of the shipments had not yet been confirmed. According to Wallison, ``Keel exploded, telling me that this is what the President wanted, this is what the AG [attorney general] wants, and this is what the National Security Adviser wants; that the Pres. [President] had already said as much earlier in the week; that this statute was the AG's to interpret, and I should not go around expressing disagreement with the AG's conclusions.'' The sentence that all laws had been complied with was inserted in the President's address over Wallison's objection.26 26 Wallison Diary, 11/14/86, ALU 0138222-23, pp. 253-54. Wallison remained concerned about the legality of the shipments and tried repeatedly to discuss the subject with Meese. When Wallison finally spoke with Meese on the afternoon of November 13, Meese said he would have Cooper contact him. That evening, Cooper explained his theory on the legality of the arms shipments as set forth in the memorandum he had delivered to Meese, based on the January 1986 Finding authorizing the shipments as a covert action under the National Security Act. Cooper argued that the President had inherent constitutional powers, recognized in the National Security Act, to conduct the arms sales without notifying Congress. Wallison responded that Cooper's approach would ``provoke a constitutional confrontation that we have tried to avoid in the context of the War Powers Resolution.'' 27 27 Ibid., p. 254, ALU 0138223. Wallison also asked Cooper how long he had been working on this project. Cooper responded, ``about a day.'' Wallison noted in his diary that ``[i]t thus appeared that the Pres. [President] was going to state in his speech that no laws had been violated but the Justice Dept., which supposedly had given him that advice had not even begun to research the question in any depth.'' 28 The problem was even greater than Wallison suspected: The 1985 shipments, particularly the November HAWK shipment in which the NSC and CIA acted without a Finding, had yet to be acknowledged by Administration officials. 28 Ibid., p. 255, ALU 0138224. Dissidence about the arms sales among the President's top advisers broke into the open on Sunday, November 16, when Shultz appeared on CBS-TV's ``Face the Nation.'' Shultz stated that he opposed any further arms sales to Iran but, when pressed, conceded that he could not speak for the Administration.29 29 Weinberger's diary notes for the day reflect that he spoke to Poindexter later that day ``re Shultz `distancing himself' '' from the Iran arms sales. (Weinberger Note, 11/15/86, ALZ 0040539.) On November 18, Wallison called a meeting of the general counsel of the agencies involved in the Iran arms sales. Present at the meeting were Wallison, Paul Thompson from the NSC, Cooper, Abraham D. Sofaer from State, H. Lawrence Garrett III from the Defense Department, David Doherty from the CIA, and an attorney from the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.30 The purpose of the meeting, according to Wallison, ``was to see if . . . [they] could agree to a common set of theories to support the position that the Administration would take in testimony and briefings on the Hill.'' 31 30 Wallison Note, 11/18/86, p. 258, ALU 0138204. 31 Ibid. Cooper explained his theory that the 1986 shipments were legal pursuant to the President's inherent constitutional authority as recognized by the National Security Act, and that the reporting requirements of the AECA did not apply. Cooper noted that the failure to notify Congress of the 1986 arms sales, which were authorized by the January 17 Finding, was defensible because there were precedents for delayed congressional notification of covert operations.32 Wallison questioned whether Cooper's ``exception'' to the AECA could ``swallow up the statute,'' but everyone else supported Cooper's view.33 32 Ibid., p. 259; Sofaer Note, 11/18/86, ALV 000309. 33 Wallison Note, 11/18/86, ALV 0138228, p. 259. Paul Thompson, general counsel to the NSC staff, briefed the group on the September 1985 TOW shipment, explaining that Israel had shipped the TOWs to Iran and that the United States replenished Israel's stocks after the January 17, 1986, Finding was signed.34 According to Sofaer, Cooper -- apparently relying on a draft chronology of the arms sales prepared by the NSC staff that he had been given the day before 35 -- said that the United States had no advance knowledge of the TOW shipment but learned about it after the fact and later replenished Israel's stocks.36 Wallison understood that U.S. officials had known about the shipment, but had not approved it.37 In any event, no one had a viable legal theory for justifying the failure to report the September 1985 shipment to Congress, as required by the AECA.38 Wallison questioned whether Meese had known of the pre-Finding shipments before telling the President everything was legal, and Cooper agreed to check with Meese.39 Curiously, the November 1985 HAWK shipment was not discussed at the meeting, even though it was listed on the draft NSC chronology Cooper had obtained the previous day.40 34 Cooper Note, 11/18/86, ALV 077953; Cooper, FBI 302, 1/6/88, pp. 2, 5. 35 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 23-24. 36 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 9/29/92, pp. 8-9, 15; Sofaer Note, 11/18/86, ALV 000309. 37 Wallison Note, 11/18/86, ALU 0138228, p. 269. 38 Ibid. Even Cooper was concerned, at that time, that the pre-Finding shipments might violate the AECA. (Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, p. 44.) Ultimately, however, Cooper determined that the AECA did not apply to even the pre-Finding shipments. 39 Wallison Note, 11/18/86, ALU 0138228, p. 259. Cooper could not recall agreeing to check with Meese. (Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, p. 50.) 40 Ibid., pp. 24-25. The Wallison and Sofaer notes of the meeting do not reflect any discussion of the November 1985 shipment. Also at the meeting, Sofaer, Garrett, Wallison, and Cooper complained to Thompson that the NSC staff was ``stiffing everybody'' by withholding factual information.41 Sofaer and Wallison stated that without the facts they could not advise their clients and Meese would have to be the sole spokesperson on the legal issues.42 Thompson nevertheless refused to provide additional facts.43 41 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, p. 32; Wallison Note, 11/18/86, pp. 258-59; Sofaer Note, 11/18/86, ALV 000309-10. 42 Wallison Note, 11/18/86, ALU 0138227-28, pp. 258-59; Sofaer Note, 11/18/86, ALV 000309-10. 43 Ibid., 259. Sofaer met that afternoon with Shultz's executive assistant, M. Charles Hill, to debrief him about the general counsel meeting. Sofaer told Hill that Thompson and the CIA were refusing to give the other lawyers the facts. Sofaer explained the legal rationale for the 1986 arms transfers, pursuant to the January 17 Finding and noted that there were two problems with the Administration's position. First, Sofaer noted, one of the transfers occurred after an August 1986 amendment to the AECA which ``g008absolutely prohibit[ed] shipments to Iran.'' 44 The second and ``more serious'' problem Sofaer identified was the ``Sept[ember] 1985 Israeli transfer of arms to Iran'' and the subsequent replenishment of those arms by the United States,45 because there was no Finding authorizing either action. Sofaer added that ``If Admin claims we did g008not approve Sept 85 transfer + it can be proved we g008did, its a Watergate style thing.'' 46 Sofaer had ``suspicions'' that people were ``trying to hide the facts'' and was concerned that Poindexter and Meese were ``shutting . . . [him] out'' because they already had their legal arguments set and didn't want him involved because he would ``only permit arguments within certain parameters.'' 47 44 Hill Note, 11/18/86, ANS 0001837 (emphasis in original). The amendment, Section 509 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399 (1986), prohibits sending weapons to any country the Secretary of State has identified as a supporter of international terrorism. Secretary Shultz declared Iran a supporter of terrorism in 1984. (49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (1984).) The amendment was troublesome because it appears to absolutely prohibit arms shipments to Iran unless the President (1) determines the shipment is ``important to the national interests of the United States'' and (2) submits a report to Congress ``justifying that determination'' and describing the proposed shipment.'' Cooper ultimately decided the amendment was irrelevant to the Iran arms sales because the AECA itself did not apply to shipments made pursuant to the President's inherent authority as implicitly recognized by the National Security Act. (Memorandum for the Attorney General, 12/17/86, p. 13, ALV 077743.) 45 Ibid. 46 Hill Note, 11/18/86, ANS 0001837 (emphasis in original). 47 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 9/29/92 pp. 23-31. Sofaer and Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost, who was to be the State Department's representative at the November 21 hearings before the Senate and House intelligence committees, met later on November 18 with Poindexter for a further briefing on the arms sales. According to Sofaer's memorandum of the meeting, Poindexter said that McFarlane had ``refused expressly to sanction'' in advance Israel's September 1985 TOW shipment to Iran but had indicated that the United States would continue to sell weapons to Israel even if it proceeded with the transfer.48 Poindexter's presentation to Sofaer and Armacost once again omitted any mention of the November 1985 HAWK shipment. According to Sofaer's memorandum, he and Armacost ``emphasized the need to prepare all witnesses carefully, and to answer correctly all questions, especially those related to activities prior to January 17.'' 49 48 Memorandum of Conversation from Sofaer, 11/18/86, ALV 000329. 49 Ibid., ALV 000333. The morning of November 19, Shultz met with Hill, Armacost, and Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead to discuss the possibility of resigning. The three agreed that Shultz and the State Department had been put in an untenable position by the public revelation that the Administration had been secretly selling arms to Iran while Shultz, who had known about the arms sales, had been promoting the official U.S. policy of discouraging arms sales to Iran and refusing to make concessions to terrorists.50 Armacost complained that the NSC staff was ``not telling . . . [State] the truth.'' 51 50 Hill Note, 11/19/86, ANS 0001847. 51 Ibid. Meanwhile, President Reagan was preparing for his press conference scheduled for that evening. Shultz met with the President that afternoon to attempt to persuade him to announce publicly that all aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran would be returned to the State Department. Shultz argued that the President had been misled by his other advisers regarding Iran's role in terrorism and advised him to ``watch out about saying [there had been] no deals for host[a]g[es].'' 52 According to Hill's notes of Shultz's report on the meeting, Shultz also told the President his understanding of the November 1985 HAWK shipment at that meeting: ``Bud once told me about a plane of arms that w[oul]d go if host[a]g[es] released -- not if not. P[resident] knew of this -- but it didn't come off.'' 53 52 Hill Note, 11/19/86, ANS 0001852. 53 Ibid. Meese did not participate in preparing President Reagan for the November 19 press conference, but he and Wallison agreed that the President should say he relied on Meese's advice that all the shipments were legal.54 Wallison advised the President to ``cite the AG'' 55 if legal questions arose. 54 Wallison Note, 11/19/86, ALU 0138231, p. 262. 55 Ibid. Despite Shultz's warning, President Reagan insisted in his press conference that evening that there had been no exchange of arms for hostages. To dispel this ``widespread but mistaken perception'' of the policy, Reagan pledged that there would be no further arms sales to Iran and promised again that ``all information will be provided to the appropriate members of Congress.'' In response to questions, President Reagan stated that no third countries had been involved in the arms sales. He also denied that there had been any U.S. involvement in arms sales to Iran before the January 17, 1986, Finding, even though he had just that afternoon told Shultz he knew of the November 1985 HAWK shipment. Because Donald Regan had told reporters in an earlier briefing that the United States had acquiesced in an Israeli shipment of arms to Iran, the White House was compelled to issue a correction of the President's statement.56 56 Ibid., ALU 0138232, p. 263. Shultz, who watched the press conference with Hill and another aide, was alarmed by President Reagan's inaccurate statements and asked the aide to review the transcript and identify the factual errors.57 He immediately called Regan to schedule an appointment with the President the following day. 57 Hill Note, 11/19/86, ANS 0001862. Conflicting Stories on the November 1985 HAWK Shipment On November 20, 1986, Meese and Cooper met for about two hours with Casey, CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates, Poindexter, Thompson, and North in Poindexter's office to prepare Casey's congressional testimony and Poindexter's congressional briefing scheduled for the next day. Meese's role in the meeting is unclear, largely because of his own conflicting testimony. In December 1987 Meese told the Grand Jury he ``had been there primarily to be available in case any legal matters came up. I don't remember that any did particularly. I think we may have talked about the Arms Export Control Act.'' 58 In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee in December 1986, however, Meese indicated that discussion of the legal issues dominated, explaining that he had been present to ensure ``they had properly represented the Findings in the chronology, and if I remember correctly we discussed the nature of the Findings, the legal theories that were involved, and it was that more than any factual basis.'' 59 Poindexter testified that Meese flagged the 1985 shipments as the key legal problem: ``And sometime in that conversation Ed said that on both the September shipment of TOWs and the November shipment of HAWKs, that -- I don't want to put words in his mouth, but it was something along the line that it would make a difference whether the President approved it ahead of time or afterwards, or words to that effect.'' 60 This would become the theme of Meese's November 21-24 investigation as he sought to shield President Reagan from any question of illegal actions. 58 Meese, Grand Jury, 12/16/87, p. 163. 59 Meese, SSCI Testimony, 12/17/86, p. 17 (emphasis added). 60 Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 6/17/87, pp. 347-49. The meeting focused on preparing Casey's testimony on the CIA's role in the November 1985 HAWK shipment.61 According to the draft of Casey's testimony, ``We in CIA did not find out that our airline had hauled HAWK missiles into Iran until mid-January [1986] when we were told by the Iranians.'' 62 In fact, North and Poindexter, as well as many CIA personnel, knew in advance that the November 1985 shipment contained weapons. Casey had been told by McFarlane on November 14, 1985, that the Israelis were planning a weapons shipment to Iran; he was receiving intelligence reports which made clear the cargo was weapons, and he had seen the Finding CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin had prepared shortly after the shipment, which sought to retroactively authorize CIA involvement in it. Nevertheless, everyone in the meeting apparently remained silent while North revised the draft testimony to include the broader assertion that ``no one in the USG [U.S. Government]'' knew before January 1986 that the cargo was weapons.63 61 Cooper, FBI 302, 11/21/90, p. 8. Thompson testified that the HAWKs were an issue during the preparation session, because it ``was still a dangling paragraph to have the CIA suddenly receiving a call from somebody, a U.S. Government person or other, and then responding to it by having a CIA aircraft made available for this. It just didn't seem very characteristic of the way the CIA normally does operations, and so I think it called a lot of attention to itself. . . . I know that was certainly a concern of the Justice Department, that why would the CIA get involved in an airplane shipment and not know more about it, the basis for it.'' (Thompson, Grand Jury, 5/20/87, p. 157.) 62 Draft Memorandum Re: CIA Airline Involvement, 11/20/86, AMY 000732; Cooper, Select Committees Testimony, 6/25/87, pp. 239-42. 63 Cooper, Select Committees Testimony, 6/25/87, pp. 45-46; Draft Memorandum Re: CIA Airline Involvement, AMY 000732. North also changed a statement about why the HAWKs were returned to Israel -- from an accurate account that the Iranians were dissatisfied with the type of missiles they were sold to a false account that the United States was upset about the arms shipment and ``jaw-boned'' the Iranians into returning the HAWKs.64 Again, no one challenged North's change. Cooper testified that he had ``no reason whatsoever not to accept'' North's version of the return of the HAWK missiles.65 64 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 70, 39-40. 65 Ibid., p. 40. Cooper said that no one objected to North's changes because, ``[i]n fact, the meeting was such that with respect to all these changes . . . North seemed to be the person who had a basis for knowing what the facts were. It was my impression that Poindexter didn't know one way or the other on this. It was my impression that Casey didn't know one way or the other on these changes, and that he was, like I was, accepting of North's information because North appeared to know what he was talking about. . . .'' 66 66 Cooper, Grand Jury, 1/11/88, pp. 55-56. North, on the other hand, suggested that Casey, Thompson, Poindexter and Meese did not object to his changes, because ``they had a darned good reason for not putting the straight story out, and their reasons might have been the same as mine.'' 67 67 North, Select Committee Testimony, 7/8/87, p. 93. North's basis for including Meese among those who knew that the United States had approved the November HAWK shipment in advance is unclear. While North was shaping Casey's testimony, Hill at the State Department was briefing Sofaer and Armacost on the Iran arms sales from his contemporaneous notes to prepare for Armacost's testimony the next day. Hill disclosed that while in Geneva on November 18, 1985, McFarlane had told Shultz about a planned shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of the hostages.68 During the briefing, Sofaer received a draft of Casey's proposed testimony.69 Because he had just learned that Shultz knew of the November 1985 HAWK shipment in advance, Sofaer was skeptical of the assertion in Casey's draft testimony that the CIA did not learn the nature of the cargo of the November 1985 HAWK shipment until January 1986.70 Sofaer told Hill that he was going to tell Meese and Wallison about his ``concern about g008pre-Jan 17 '86 activities.'' 71 68 Sofaer Note, 11/20/86, ALV 000334. 69 Sofaer Chronology, 5/19/87, ALV 000306. 70 Ibid.; Sofaer, Select Committees Deposition, 6/18/87, pp. 31-37. 71 Hill Note, 11/20/86, ANS 0001867 (emphasis in original). Sofaer explained: ``A/G & P[resident] in vulnerable position. A/G gave his opinion -- but probably g008not aware of pre-Jan/post-Aug activities. Yet now is being asked to support such activities. So I tho[ugh]t I'd call the A/G secure. To bring these facts to his attn, because P[resident] doesn't know the facts. And A/G opinion on post-Jan 17 acts as a wash for all arms shipments. Get every channel working to send enzyme into the system to eat away at it.'' (Ibid., ANS 0001867-68.) At about 2:30 p.m. on November 20, Sofaer placed a secure call to Meese. Meese was still in the White House meeting preparing Casey's testimony, so Sofaer spoke to Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns.72 According to Sofaer, he told Burns that he did not believe Casey's proposed testimony that everyone in the CIA thought the November 1985 shipment had contained oil-drilling parts because Shultz had contemporaneous notes that McFarlane knew the shipment was HAWK missiles.73 After exchanging messages, Sofaer spoke again to Burns shortly before 4:00 pm. Burns said that Meese had spent the afternoon with Poindexter and Casey and ``was fully aware of the facts [Sofaer] mentioned. [Burns] said the A.G. [attorney general] was profuse in his thanks for [Sofaer's] warning, and appreciated [Sofaer's] motives, but that he (the AG) knew of certain facts that explained all these matters and that laid to rest all the problems [Sofaer] might perceive.'' According to Sofaer, Burns said ``the AG did not give him any facts, and that he was simply passing on the `mysterious' assurance that all was well.'' 74 72 Sofaer, Select Committees Deposition, 6/18/87, pp. 37-40. 73 Ibid., pp. 38-39. Burns could not recall the details of what Sofaer told him, but did not question Sofaer's version. (Burns, FBI 302, 10/29/87, p. 5.) 74 Sofaer Note, 11/20/86, ALV 000347-48. Burns said that, although he did not understand the information Sofaer had related, he relayed it immediately to Meese. (Burns, FBI 302, 10/29/87, pp. 5-6.) Burns vividly recalls walking upstairs to Meese's office and telling him in person as Meese was preparing to leave for the airport. Meese testified that Burns called him on his car phone while he was en route to Andrews Air Force Base. Meese said he ``advised Mr. Burns that this matter was being taken care of because we just had been going through putting together what was, to the best of my knowledge at that time, an accurate description of what had occurred.'' (Meese, Select Committees Deposition, 7/8/87, p. 67.) After the Casey testimony preparation session, Thompson and Cooper met with Wallison at Wallison's request.75 According to Wallison, they discussed the summer 1985 TOW shipment by Israel, which, they believed, the United States subsequently condoned: 75 Wallison Note, 11/20/86, ALU 0138235-36, pp. 266-67; Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 60-61. Under the law this sale -- a violation of the AECA -- should have been reported to Congress but was not. Neither Cooper nor Thompson could think of any way to justify this lapse, and neither could I, but I suggested that we give some consideration to arguing that when the Israelis told us they had done this, the availability of the channel thus opened made the ensuing events part of an intelligence activity. This was a little farfetched in terms of the real facts, it turned out . . . and so we were thrown back to arguing that under the Const. [Constitution] the Pres. [President] has the inherent power to permit third countries to sell arms without reporting to Cong. [Congress]76 76 Ibid., ALU 0138235, p. 266. While the meeting was in progress, Sofaer, unsatisfied with Meese's assurance that all was well, called Wallison to discuss the discrepancy between Casey's proposed testimony and Hill's notes. According to Wallison, Sofaer ``was worried that the Pres. [President] had not told the truth last night [at the press conference], and hoped that the Pres. had not been informed fully.'' Sofaer ``then asked . . . whether [Wallison] knew about the sale of Hawk missiles by Israel to Iran in November.'' 77 When Wallison said he did not, Sofaer told him that McFarlane had informed Shultz in Geneva in November 1985 that Israel would be shipping HAWK missiles to Iran as part of an effort to free the hostages. Sofaer also told Wallison that North had worked with the CIA to arrange for the CIA proprietary airline to deliver the missiles. This, Sofaer said, made Casey's proposed testimony that the CIA did not learn that the cargo was weapons until January 1986 highly dubious and he suggested Wallison ``look into it.'' 78 77 Ibid., ALU 0138236, p. 267. 78 Sofaer, Select Committees Testimony, 6/18/87 pp. 42-43. Sofaer had not yet learned that Casey's testimony had been broadened to say that ``no one in the USG'' knew the cargo was weapons until January 1986. According to Sofaer, Wallison was ``in shock'' after these disclosures.79 Wallison described his reaction as follows: 79 Sofaer Chronology, 5/19/87, ALV 000306. Since Cooper and Thompson were sitting right there, I asked them whether they had heard this story, and they confirmed that they had. Of course, if I had not asked they undoubtedly would not have told me voluntarity [sic]. This was perhaps the most serious disclosure of all. It indicates that well before the finding in January 1986 there had been in existence a plan to seek release of all the hostages by trading them for arms to Iran. . . . If the story is true, then everything the Pres. [President] had said about the foundations of our policy was incorrect -- if he was aware of these facts. Otherwise, if the Pres. was not aware, there had been a clear violation of the export laws which had not been reported to Congress. One could hardly argue that the Pres. had invoked his constitutional powers when he was not aware of what had been planned.80 80 Wallison Note, 11/20/86, p. 267, ALU 0138236. Cooper recalls that while he knew of the November 1985 HAWK shipment, he was immediately concerned about the accuracy of Casey's proposed testimony that ``no one in the USG'' learned that the cargo was weapons until January 1986.81 According to Cooper, upon hearing of Shultz's conversation with McFarlane, he ``turned to Paul Thompson and in very manly terms told him that he needed to get with North and McFarlane immediately and clear this up because that obviously was inconsistent with the information that North had just told us in Poindexter's office. . . .'' 82 81 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 62-63. 82 Ibid., p. 65. Cooper then went to his office, where he spoke with Sofaer directly.83 He told Sofaer that Casey's testimony had been changed to include the broader denial that ``no one in the USG'' knew that the shipment contained weapons until January 1986. Sofaer told Cooper he knew that assertion was impossible because McFarlane had informed Shultz in November 1985 that the cargo would be HAWK missiles.84 Cooper asked if Sofaer was certain, and Sofaer told him of Hill's contemporaneous notes, which indicated that McFarlane specifically told Shultz the cargo was HAWKs. Cooper felt that lent ``a lot of credibility'' to Shultz's story and that the ``gravity of the inconsistency'' between Shultz's recollection and the NSC version of events was greatly increased.85 83 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, p. 65. Sofaer recalled that Wallison passed the phone to Cooper during their meeting and that Sofaer told Cooper what he had told Wallison. (Sofaer, Select Committees Deposition, 6/18/87, pp. 42-43.) He recalls having a second conversation with Cooper at approximately 6:00 p.m. during which they discussed the subject in more detail. (Ibid., pp. 45-49.) Cooper did not recall speaking with Sofaer directly until the second call. (Cooper, Select Committees Testimony, 6/25/87, pp. 59-61.) 84 Sofaer, Select Committees Deposition, 6/18/87, pp. 47-49. Sofaer also told Cooper that he thought the CIA's version of its involvement in the November HAWK shipment was ``untenable as a matter of logic.'' (Ibid., pp. 43-44.) Sofaer did not believe the CIA would have made such a substantial effort to support a shipment of oil-drilling equipment. He analogized the oil-drilling equipment story to the type of cover story used by drug dealers who never mention drugs by name in conversations, referring to them euphemistically as ``shirts'' or other objects. (Ibid.) 85 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 65-66. Sofaer told Cooper that if Casey's testimony was not corrected, he would advise Armacost to tell Congress there was contemporaneous U.S. Government knowledge of the November 1985 HAWK shipment, taking a direct stand against Casey.86 Sofaer also threatened to resign if Casey's testimony was not corrected. Cooper assured Sofaer that he shared Sofaer's concerns and that he would also resign if Casey gave false testimony to Congress.87 Cooper then tried to contact Meese. 86 Cooper, Select Committees Testimony, 6/25/87, p. 64. 87 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 80-81; Cooper, Select Committees Testimony, 6/25/87, pp. 64-65. Meanwhile, Shultz went to the White House late in the afternoon on November 20 with a list of factual errors the President had made in his press conference.88 In the presence of Regan, Shultz attempted to persuade the President that the public would never believe that the Iran arms sales were not an ``arms-for-hostages'' swap.89 Shultz again raised the November 1985 HAWK shipment as an example and argued that the plan McFarlane had outlined to Shultz in Geneva was described expressly as an arms-for-hostages deal.90 President Reagan responded that he knew about the November 1985 shipment, ``but that wasn't arms for hostages.'' 91 88 Hill Note, 11/20/86, ALW 0059427. Weinberger, in contrast, noted that he ``[w]atched President's press conference'' and then ``[c]alled President -- to congratulate him on his press conference.'' (Weinberger Note, 11/19/86, ALZ 0040547.) 89 Hill Note, 11/22/86, ALW 0059429-30. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. Shultz had briefly met with the President on November 19, before the press conference, but could not recall in his testimony whether he discussed the November 1985 shipment on the 19th or on the 20th. (Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/23/87, pp. 110-12.) Hill's notes of November 19 reflect that Shultz told the President his version of the 1985 HAWK shipment discussions: ``Bud once told me about a plane of arms that w[oul]d go if host[a]g[es] released -- not if not. P[resident] knew of this -- but it didn't come off.'' (Hill Note, 11/19/86, ANS 0001852.) On November 22, Shultz told Hill ``I told P[resident] Thursday [November 20] of what Bud told me about Nov 85. He s[ai]d he knew it. When dug into -- will be shown that P[resident] pushed these people.'' (Hill Note, 11/22/86, ALW 0059428.) When Shultz was interviewed by Meese, he reiterated that story. (Ibid., ALW 005929-30.) Hill's notes thus suggest that Shultz discussed the 1985 HAWK shipment with the President on both November 19 and November 20. Cooper finally reached Meese at West Point at 10:30 p.m. and told him about the factual dispute over the HAWKs.92 According to Meese, Cooper told him ``there were concerns in the State Department that there was a good deal more knowledge within the Government about the fact of HAWKS being shipped in November 1985 that was known then than anything we had been led to believe earlier that afternoon.'' 93 Meese paid attention to Cooper's concerns; Meese agreed that nothing should be said about the HAWK shipment until the facts were clear.94 Meese told Cooper to contact David Doherty, general counsel of the CIA, and to go to the CIA in the morning to make sure Casey's testimony was changed.95 At Cooper's urging, Meese decided to return to Washington the next day, cancelling a planned appearance at Harvard University.96 92 Cooper Chronology, 11/86, ALV 077959. 93 Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/8/87, p. 69. 94 Although Meese could not recall any specifics about his conversation with Burns, he generally recalled that Burns informed him about ``possible inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the proposed testimony of Mr. Casey.'' (Meese, Select Committees Deposition, 7/8/87, p. 68.) Meese said he ``assumed'' these ``inconsistencies or inaccuracies'' had been resolved by the changes and corrections made in the preparation session that afternoon. (Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/28/87, p. 68.) It is difficult to believe that Meese could reasonably have thought that any of those changes would have resolved whatever ``inconsistency or inaccuracy'' could have prompted an urgent call from Sofaer. In a vague and circular response, Meese explained that the information Cooper gave him ``differed -- it was much -- a whole new area of information that was beyond what I had assumed Mr. Burns was telling me because it went beyond the corrections that we had made in the testimony . . . in Mr. Poindexter's office.'' (Meese, Select Committees Deposition, 7/8/87, p. 72. Emphasis added.) One plausible explanation for Meese's changed reaction could be that Cooper apparently did not think the changes in the testimony made in Poindexter's office had corrected the problem Sofaer had raised. It is worth noting, however, that while Burns apparently did not tell Meese about any documentation of the inaccuracies or inconsistencies Sofaer had mentioned, (Ibid., p. 70,) Cooper told him that the State Department had a contemporaneous note that George Shultz had been informed in November 1985 by McFarlane that there were HAWKs on the shipment. (Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, p. 66.) As became apparent later in Meese's investigation, deniability of the President's involvement in the November 1985 HAWK shipment could be maintained if there were inconsistencies in memory; a contemporaneous note made it much more difficult. 95 Meese, Select Committees Deposition, 7/8/87, pp. 74-75; Cooper, Select Committees Testimony, 6/25/87, p. 66. 96 Ibid., p. 66. After speaking to Poindexter at 11:00 p.m., Cooper called Doherty to tell him to delete the reference in Casey's testimony to U.S. knowledge of the HAWKs shipment; Doherty advised Cooper it already had been deleted.97 Cooper then called Sofaer at 11:28 p.m. and told him that Meese shared their concerns about the November 1985 shipment and that Meese had canceled his Boston trip.98 According to Sofaer's notes, Cooper had ``[v]ery many questions about CH's [Charles Hill's] notes. When taken? What written? AG [attorney general] very interested.'' Cooper told Sofaer that Thompson had spoken to North, who adhered to his story, and that Poindexter had tried to reach McFarlane but had been unable to do so. Cooper told Sofaer that Casey's testimony had been ``[a]djusted correctly to avoid [the] issue'' of the November 1985 HAWK shipment. Sofaer congratulated Cooper, and they ``agreed P[resident] should not be placed at risk till truth is known. Worst outcome is `self-immolation.' Can deal w/ legal difficulties.'' 99 97 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 98 Sofaer Note, 11/20/86, ALV 000350. 99 Ibid. Although the broad assertion that ``no one'' in the U.S. Government knew about the shipment was deleted from Casey's opening statement to the intelligence committees on November 21, Casey did not disclose that the Administration had participated in the November 1985 HAWK shipment.100 Casey also failed to disclose the existence of the December 1985 presidential Finding to authorize retroactively CIA participation in the transfer.101 Casey was well aware of that Finding, which identified the November shipment as an ``arms for hostages'' deal, because he had sent it to Poindexter for President Reagan's signature.102 100 Casey, SSCI Testimony, 11/21/86, pp. 8-9, 31-32; HPSCI Testimony, 11/21/86, pp. 5-7. 101 Poindexter later testified that it was on this day that he destroyed the December 1985 Finding because it described a straight arms-for-hostages exchange and would be politically embarrassing. (Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 7/15/87, pp. 44, 123.) 102 Poindexter, Select Committees Deposition, 6/17/87, pp. 370-71. Developing a ``Coherent Overview'' On Friday morning, November 21, 1986, Meese returned to Washington and met with Cooper, Burns, Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, and chief of staff John Richardson.103 According to Cooper, the group discussed the plan he and Meese had agreed to on the night before over the phone: that Meese would meet with the President and offer to take responsibility to investigate ``the President's, the Government's knowledge'' of the Iran arms sales ``as accurately as possible, and completely as possible in as short a period of time as possible before some error was made.'' 104 During the meeting, Cooper made a preliminary list of persons to interview -- McFarlane, Shultz, Sporkin, North, Poindexter, Weinberger, Vice President Bush, President Reagan, Regan, and Casey.105 103 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 73-77; Meese Schedule, 11/21/86, ALV 080343. 104 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92 pp. 73-76. 105 Cooper Note, 11/21/86, ALV 077958; Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 77-78. Cooper was not certain whether he made his list before the meeting or during it, but it reflected his thoughts about ``who should be talked to and roughly the order in which they should be talked to.'' (Ibid. pp. 77-78.) Cooper took only two notes from his morning meeting with Meese: ``Any legal problems. Are there other facts that would raise crim[inal] problems.'' 106 Cooper testified that there was a general concern about legal problems, including possible crimes. Cooper, at least, believed at that time that North and Poindexter had known that ``there were HAWKs on the plane'' and that the day before, ``they were saying something to me and others in the room that they knew to be untrue and were suggesting that information should go to Congress.'' 107 106 Cooper Note, 11/21/86, ALV 077958. 107 Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92 pp. 78-82. Cooper had previously testified, when not confronted with his note, that while there was concern about contemporaneous knowledge by U.S. officials of the HAWK shipment, there was no concern about possible criminal violations. (Cooper, FBI 302, 1/6/88, p. 8; Cooper, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87 p. 126 (not a ``suggestion or hint'' of criminal violation at that point).) Meese, on the other hand, denied that the legality of the November HAWK shipment was a concern in his investigation. He testified that his inquiry was premised on the ``assumption that everything was legal,'' and he did not ``believe the question of legality ever came up until the memorandum was found [on November 22] regarding the diversion.'' Asked when the issue of the legality of the November HAWK shipment arose, Meese responded, ``I don't know that it ever did come up.'' 108 108 Meese, OIC Interview, 5/11/92 pp. 35-36. Cooper had taken a similar position before being confronted with his contemporaneous notes. At the 8:30 a.m. staff meeting on November 21, 1986, which Meese did not attend because his flight did not arrive from West Point until 8:30, the third item on the agenda was ``Iran -- > Legality -- '' (Meeting Agenda, 11/21/86, ALV 033705.) John Richardson, Meese's chief of staff and one of the three trusted aides Meese chose to conduct the weekend investigation, explained, ``The big problem for us was what laws might have been kicked in to focus or violated by the Administration by shipping these arms in '85, before there was a Finding in '86, and that was the entire focus [of the investigation], whether the U.S. Government knew about it and authorized it.'' (Richardson, Grand Jury, 12/11/87, p. 43.) While Meese was meeting with his staff, Regan was meeting with Wallison, who had been alarmed by Sofaer's revelation that McFarlane had briefed Shultz about the November 1985 HAWK shipment in advance.109 Wallison told Regan that this shipment ``raised serious legal questions because a shipment like that would either have to be reported as a shipment by the US or as a violation of the AECA by Israel, and neither was done.'' 110 109 Wallison Note, 11/20/86, p. 268, ALU 0138237. 110 Ibid. After conferring with his staff, Meese met with the President, Poindexter, and Regan at 11:30 a.m. at the White House.111 Meese explained that a problem had arisen with Casey's proposed testimony because ``the CIA was doing some things, the Department of Defense was doing other things, the NSC staff had certain responsibilities, and so on, and because of the highly compartmentalized nature of the whole initiative . . . people had not talked to each other, you did not have the normal documentation and reporting, and . . . therefore there was a great deal of confusion . . .'' 112 Meese told the President it was ``absolutely necessary'' that ``someone look into the matter . . . to develop a coherent overview of the facts,'' and offered to do it himself.113 The President accepted Meese's offer to ``look into the matter,'' and asked him to report his findings at a senior advisers meeting set for November 24, 1986.114 111 Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/28/87 pp. 75-76; Meese Schedule, 11/21/86, ALV 080343. 112 Ibid., p. 76. 113 Ibid., pp. 76-77. Meese maintains that he was not acting in his capacity as attorney general in conducting an investigation, but rather was operating as any other Cabinet member might in compiling a factual ``overview.'' (Meese, OIC interview, 5/11/92, p. 36.) In the North trial, Meese testified that he was acting as the President's counselor and friend. (Meese, North Trial Testimony, 3/28/89, pp. 5746-47.) 114 Ibid., pp. 77-78. Meese said he did not ask President Reagan -- or Poindexter or Regan -- about his knowledge of the arms sales because it ``didn't seem very important'' at that stage of the inquiry. Cooper testified, however, that he and Meese had ``resolved'' in their telephone conversation the night before that Meese ``was going to go in and talk to the President about the state of the President's, the Government's knowledge of the Iran matter and advise him that somebody needed to take responsibility for . . . collecting the facts as accurately and completely as possible.'' 115 Cooper included President Reagan on his list of persons to interview,116 but Meese, on a similar list, did not.117 In Cooper's mind, what the President knew about the November HAWK shipment and when he knew it was a ``primary concern'' of the investigation at that point.118 Meese, however, has testified that he never got around to asking the President what he knew about the HAWK shipment.119 115 Cooper, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87, p. 122 (emphasis added); Cooper, Grand Jury, 7/15/92, pp. 75-76. 116 Cooper Note, 11/21/86, ALV 077958. 117 Meese Note, 11/21/86, ALV 015778. 118 Cooper, Grand Jury testimony, 7/15/92, p. 94. 119 Meese, OIC interview, 5/11/92, p. 72. At 12:30 p.m., following his meeting with the President, Meese returned to the Justice Department, where he met over lunch with his investigative team, all trusted political appointees -- Cooper, Reynolds and Richardson.120 Meese wrote down a list of people to be interviewed, including McFarlane, Shultz, North, Thompson, Weinberger, Vice President Bush, and a number of CIA officials who had been involved in the November 1985 shipment. On a separate list entitled ``Action,'' Meese listed questions to ask various people. Next to Poindexter's initials, Meese wrote ``Every document, telephone logs, etc.[;] Contact person -- Paul Thompson?[; and] What did GPS [(Shultz)] give to or show RR [Ronald Reagan]?'' Later that afternoon, Meese telephoned Poindexter and checked off each of the three questions.121 120 The choice of political appointees reflected Meese's concern that the President's ``political opponents . . . might try to claim that there was some kind of a cover-up and that would be a position of vulnerability even though there was absolutely no cover-up going on.'' (Meese, North Trial Testimony, 3/29/89, pp. 5854-55.) 121 Meese Note, 11/21/86, ALV 015779; Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/28/87, pp. 82-84. Poindexter later testified that following this conversation with Meese, Poindexter called Paul Thompson and asked him to pull together the Iran documents. Later that afternoon, Thompson showed Poindexter the December 1985 Finding signed by the President, which sought to retroactively authorize the CIA's involvement in the November HAWK shipment. Poindexter then destroyed the only known signed version of that Finding.122 122 Poindexter, Select Committees Deposition, 5/2/87, p. 108. Meanwhile, McFarlane, who apparently had learned that the State Department had co